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INTENT, ORIGINALITY, CREATIVITY
AND JOINT AUTHORSHIP*
Russ VerSteegt
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s America and the world came to grips with
the paramount importance of copyright law. Computer
technology advanced to such a degree that we now can store
more information in smaller spaces and transmit it more
rapidly than would have been imaginable just a few years
earlier. Because copyright is one of the principal legal
mechanisms for protecting information technology, copyright
has, in many respects, leapt to the forefront of legal and social
interest. Global information and copyright policy have been the
subject of robust debate and are a matter of immediate concern
due to their economic and social importance. The development
of copyright law is vital to the world's education, entertainment
and economy. But in the midst of this dramatic focus on
worldwide, macroscopic data policy and planning, courts and
commentators have taken steps to radically alter a seemingly
small but important element in the copyright calculus, namely
the element of intent. These steps need further clarification
and explanation. Without a viable framework for dealing with
the concept of intent as it relates to originality and joint
authorship, many works protected by copyright law will be at
risk. In our understandable rush to comprehend and discuss
the "big issues," we may have neglected some of the elemental
building blocks of the law. International standards and
comprehensive information strategies may ultimately be of
©2002 Russ VerSteeg. All Rights Reserved.
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little use if we allow copyright doctrine itself to rot from within.
In short, we must be certain that we are minding the health of
the individual trees as well as attending to forest management.
That is why it is important to understand precisely what we
mean when we refer to "intent" as it relates to originality and
joint authorship.
This article focuses on three essential copyright issues:
(1) defining "intent" as it relates to originality; (2) defining
"originality" in terms of distinguishable/meaningful variations
on a pre-existing work, rather than the conventional but
ambiguous term, "creativity"; and (3) defining "intent" as it
relates to joint authorship. In Part I, the article reviews David
Nimmer's exploration of "intent" as an element of originality.
Nimmer's article, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, posits that
an author's intent is paramount in determining originality and
copyrightability.1 This section proposes, to the contrary, that
courts ought to evaluate the nature of a putative author's
variations as a means of determining originality, rather than
invoking the undefined requirement of "creativity." This Part
then briefly examines three recent cases that have interpreted
the most influential United States Supreme Court case
construing the originality requirement, Feist v. Rural
Telephone.2 Part II examines intent in the context of joint
authorship. This Part first explores Childress v. Taylor, the
leading case on intent and joint authorship. Then, this Part
formulates a contract model of joint authorship, and draws
upon recent scholarship and case law to explain the benefits of
the model. This contract model relies on objective intent and I
generally refer to it as "the contract model." Specifically, this
model provides clear directions for apportioning rights and
economic benefits in situations involving multiple authors.
Finally, the Conclusion synthesizes the framework for
establishing originality and the role a putative author's intent
plays in copyright law.
1 David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1
(2001).
2 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
3 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
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I. ORIGINALITY
A. Intent as an Element of Originality (Nimmer's
Approach)
David Nimmer's treatment of intent and its relationship
to authorship is best understood in the context of analyzing
originality; it is best to recognize intent and originality as
distinct issues. In his epic article, Copyright in the Dead Sea
Scrolls,4 Nimmer examines the Israeli Supreme Court case of
Eisenman v. Qimron.5 Fundamentally, the issue in the case
was whether Qimron, the scholar who reconstructed the
ancient manuscripts of the Dead Sea Scrolls, was entitled to
copyright protection for his reconstruction of those ancient
texts. In a remarkable decision, the Supreme Court of Israel
ruled that he was.
Nimmer's exhaustive analysis of the case and the issues
it presents ultimately concludes that the Court's decision was a
poor one.6 Nimmer explains that the putative author's intent is
the key factor that explains why the reconstruction is not
copyrightable.7 According to Nimmer, Qimron's work is not
copyrightable because he intended to reconstruct a text that
had already once existed. He intended to recreate something
that had been in the public domain for centuries. Nimmer
argues that, in order to be original, an author must intend "to
produce something personal or subjective," which Qimron did
not.8
Although a certain element of truth supports Nimmer's
position, the meaning of "intent" in this analysis is
extraordinarily complicated and subtle, and requires more
careful explanation. A putative author's intent can be a useful
factor in determining whether a work is original. The
"meaningful/distinguishable variation" rule, however, will
eliminate a great deal of confusion in the analysis.9 Reviewing
4 Nimmer, supra note 1.
' C.A. 2790/93, 2811/93, Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. 817.
6 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 110-11.
7 Id. at 159.
8 See id. ("Copyright protection arises only for works that reflect an intent to
produce something personal or subjective. By contrast, works that are objective,
whether in fact or as presented, fail to qualify as works of 'authorship' in the copyright
sense.").
9 See Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801,
843-56 (1993) [hereinafter Rethinking Originality].
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several of Nimmer's discussions and hypothetical examples
clarifies the relationships among originality,
meaningful/distinguishable variation and intent.
In what he refers to as "Case 24: The Gourmand,"1°
Nimmer proposes the following hypothetical facts: "Connie
Sewer convinces herself that quantity is the best indicium of
quality and that she 'should' prefer restaurants that operate on
the highest volume. On that basis, she convinces herself that
her 50 favorite restaurants happen to correspond exactly to the
list just compiled."" At this juncture, Nimmer queries whether
Sewer has a valid copyright in her list. Arguably, the list is not
"original" because, like alphabetical order, an arrangement
based upon a descending order of sales volume-quantifiable
facts-is nothing more than a trivial variation of the list of
restaurants in its raw, unordered state. 12 Sewer, on the other
hand, will argde that the list reflects her subjective opinion.
She intended, she will say, to impose an order on the list that
was more than trivial. 3  Rather than allowing Sewer's
testimony regarding her subjective intent to be completely
dispositive of the issue, it makes more sense to treat it as one
factor in the calculus of "originality" (i.e., determining whether
the list is "original"). At trial, a defendant who has copied
Sewer's list will have the burden of proving that the list is a
reflection of fact rather than a subjective opinion. Subjective
opinion, presumably, bestows a variation upon the list. The
real issue is whether that variation is
meaningful/distinguishable (i.e., because it is subjective) or
whether the order of the list is "merely trivial" (i.e., because the
10 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 41.
11 Id. at 40.
12 See VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 9, at 852 n.221, 863-67.
13 See id. at 855.
This is, however, certainly not an easy issue. And difficult questions
remain as to whether an author's motives can ever be a relevant factor
in copyrightability. Clearly, in any originality analysis decision makers
should always keep in mind the tenuous nature of considering an
author's motives. For example, if an author were to arrange five public
domain works of art in a particular order, believing that that order
represented a new understanding in the development of art, would the
originality of the arrangement be jeopardized if the author's theory
later proved incorrect? Suppose someone takes Shakespeare's Sonnets,
cuts them out of a book, throws them from the top of a building, and
then gathers them in random order on the sidewalk below? Is that
ordering more trivial and less distinguishable than if she had arranged
the sonnets in the same order after painstaking analysis in an effort to
reveal some new correlation theme in the sonnets?
Id. (footnote omitted).
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order of the list is dictated by a mathematical, factual reality,
to wit sales volume).
Posing a similar hypothetical, Nimmer writes:
It is doubtful in the extreme that a dry cleaning shop could obtain
copyright in a list of garments brought from 11:00 a.m. to noon on a
given day. On the other hand a novelist could insert a laundry list
into a narrative that would reveal a good deal about the
protagonist(s)-he is a transvestite, she is a slob, they are tango
aficionados, etc. That product of the novelist's invention should
obtain copyright. Yet the unprotected and the copyrighted laundry
lists might be identical.' 4
But a simpler mode of analysis reveals that the actual laundry
list is not copyrightable because it is fact. Facts are
quintessentially unoriginal because they bear no mark of
variation that is beyond the trivial. By definition, facts are
unoriginal. Under the doctrine of fact/expression merger the
list is an uncopyrightable fact. 5 If a defendant were to copy
that list, he would have the burden to prove that the order and
content of plaintiffs list reflected factual information, rather
than a meaningful/distinguishable variation.
In exploring these concepts, Nimmer posits that the
intent of the putative author is paramount. This is especially
true in cases where the putative author intends to reconstruct
facts and presents his work to the public as such. According to
Nimmer, "there is one lesson that applies to archaeologists-
works presented to the public as factual enjoy no protection as
to elements presented as facts therein, even if those facts in
fact emerge from the author's creativity."6 This reasoning is
fundamentally sound, but it requires further explanation and
refinement to really be useful.
Suppose, for example, that an Egyptologist writes a
book or scholarly article in which he argues that the
traditionally accepted order of New Kingdom pharaohs is
wrong, and he presents a new, "correct" order. A defendant who
copies the revisionist Egyptologist's list would have a relatively
easy time proving that the list is not copyrightable. In this
hypothetical, the revisionist Egyptologist has proposed his
order of pharaohs as fact. Facts are not copyrightable. Given
the extreme uncertainty in academic/scholarly historical circles
14 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 41 n.155.
See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir.
1981).
16 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 42.
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(a world where debate is often extremely robust due to sharp
differences of opinion), a litigant, a defendant for example,
would easily prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a
plaintiffs hypothesis (e.g., the revisionist order of New
Kingdom pharaohs) is factual. In effect the plaintiff in such an
action would be estopped to argue otherwise given that the
academic purpose was to create a non-fiction work.
Presumably, the revisionist Egyptologist offers his list of
pharaohs to the academic world and the general public as
accurate, historical, chronological fact. The basic concept of
estoppel prevents him from later arguing that his list is not
fact.7
Indeed, a putative author's intent should merely be, at
the most, one piece of evidence, a lone factor, if you will, in
evaluating whether a work is original, or whether it is an
uncopyrightable fact, i.e., already in the public domain. In close
cases, certainly, it will make sense to regard the author's intent
as having created an estoppel and, therefore, to "defer" to the
author's intent to create or recreate facts. An author's intent to
reconstruct facts should create either an estoppel, or at the
very least, a rebuttable presumption-rebuttable by other
scholars who testify, for example, that the work is not
historically accurate and therefore does not qualify as a fact
work. Even in situations where other scholars convince a trier
of fact that the work in question is not accurate as fact, it may
be preferable to shield an infringer. As a matter of public
policy, an infringer who copied a work under the reasonable
but mistaken belief that it was factual would be shielded by a
fair use, estoppel or innocent infringer theory.
One may, for example, ask whether Qimron imposed
variations on the ancient text that were more than trivial. To
the extent that he attempted to reconstruct the ancient text, by
definition he cannot have attempted to impose meaningful or
subjective variations on it. On the contrary, he was attempting
to make it conform precisely to the text as it existed thousands
of years ago."8 Indeed, the same can be said of an archaeologist
17 Nimmer nibbles around the edges of this same basic conclusion. See id. at
81 ("[Flrom a deeper perspective, there is reason to posit that sound copyright doctrine
should always doom the claim of any scholar to copyright over the reconstruction of an
antecedent manuscript."). See also id. at 81 n.395 ("From an even deeper point of view,
one may well conclude that, putting aside doctrinal points, the activity of manuscript
reconstruction does not even qualify as an act of authorship so as to trigger copyright
protection.").
18 See id. at 118. See also id. at 101 ("The reconstruction of TR's words do not
[Vol. 68: 1
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who reconstructs an old broken pot that has pieces missing. He
fills in the gaps with modern clay reconstructed and molded to
fit the shape of the missing fragments. Certainly, the
archaeologist cannot claim copyright in his reconstruction
because his additions merely recreate and reflect factual
information (i.e., the shape of the old pot).19
The originality inquiry must focus on the nature of the
putatively copyrightable work itself. The process by which an
author creates and his intent are, at most, merely factors to
consider in determining whether a work is original. A putative
author's process and intent may serve as evidence relevant to
whether his variations are trivial or meaningful/-
distinguishable. Nimmer, for example, criticizes the Qimron
opinion because the judge interpreted Qimron's process as
virtually dispositive of originality. In particular, Nimmer
quotes the court: 'These [Qimron's additions, deletions and
other reconstructions] were the fruits of a process in which
Qimron used his knowledge, expertise and imagination,
exercised judgment and chose between different alternatives. "20
But when one examines Qimron's work more closely, one
realizes that although his variations to the fragmented text
which he had in front of him may have been significant, these
variations were intended to recreate facts-a document that
had existed thousands of years ago. Thus, in a case such as
this, his variations must actually be judged in relation to his
goal (i.e., recreation of fact) rather than the fragmentary
document that he had before him. At one point, Nimmer muses
about the possibility of finding originality in Qimron's process.
represent 'approximate statements of opinion' by Qimron. Instead, they represent, to
the best of Qimron's ability, what the Teacher of Righteousness actually said. Insofar
as Qimron's philological, historical, archaeological and other skills permit, they
represent an attempt as objectivity, not simply an 'expression of subjective opinion' as
to what TR might have said.") (footnotes omitted).
19 See id. at 105 ("In these and every other instance of manuscript
reconstruction, the expression merges with the idea. . . . Qimron's proposed
reconstruction, which merges idea with expression, therefore stands outside copyright
protection"). Perhaps, though, copyright is the wrong form of protection to seek.
Perhaps this is a case for the misappropriation doctrine. This is more like International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) while the "reconstruction" is "hot"
perhaps it should be afforded protection similar to "hot news." Wouldn't this theory
work to protect text reconstructions and archaeological publications better and more
appropriately? Nimmer indirectly raises this issue when he asks: "So the question
remains whether Qimron had the right to control the first publication of the
reconstruction of 4QMMT." Nimmer, supra note 1 at 153. He then briefly addresses the
potential that a copyright owner might have a limited right of divulgation. Id. at 154.
2 Id. at 119 n.585.
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He notes: "On several occasions, Qimron claims that
reconstruction 'is no more than an educated guess on the basis
of the scholar's knowledge and intuition.' These claims, if
credited, would seem to demonstrate original contributions."2'
Clearly this is not the case. Even if reconstruction is nothing
more than "educated guesses," a fact finder in litigation must
assume that the reconstructer succeeded in putting together a
document that accurately reflected the ancient text. This may
simply be a public policy presumption, giving the philologist
the benefit of the doubt. Nimmer rightly concludes that
"[t]aking Qimron at his word, this example does not deserve
copyright protection."22
The potential copyrightability of Qimron's mistakes is
another issue that Nimmer considers. Arguably, a scholar's
mistakes in reconstruction, because they fail to correspond to
fact, could be subject to copyright protection. Nimmer confronts
this issue, noting, "mistakes on Qimron's part are precisely
that-mistakes, not copyrightable expression."2 Indeed, unlike
Judge Frank's artist who makes a mistake and adopts it as his
own,24  a reconstructor makes a mistake and adopts it
unknowingly.
In another hypothetical, Nimmer raises the issue of
copyright protection arising from mistakes; but this time the
mistakes are of omission rather than commission. Nimmer
ponders the copyright status of a new version of Virginia
Woolf's book To the Lighthouse, from which the publisher
unintentionally omitted fifteen adjacent pages.25 Nimmer
submits that such a work cannot be original because "the lack
21 Nimmer, supra note I at 120-21.
Id. at 121. See also id. at 123 (quoting scholarly witness, Strungell, who
testified that the "object of the reconstruction process" was "to recover a book that
otherwise is hopelessly lost"); id. at 124 (comparing Qimron's reconstruction to the
analogous restoration of classical texts such as Aeschylus or Homer, "still the
consensus of scholars is that that is a correct reading, that is a correct
emendation.. ").
23 See id. at 126 n.624. Curiously, Nimmer later makes what appears to be an
inconsistent statement suggesting that, "it is only over errors that Qimron can claim
protection." Id. at 141-42 (referencing Judge Frank in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951)). To his credit, however, Nimmer recognizes
that "what Qimron did was in no way to adopt mistakes consciously. Instead, he offered
to the world his best efforts, painstakingly reconstructing 4QMMT as accurately as
scholarship permitted." Id. at 142.
24 See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 105; see also Nimmer, supra note 1, at
141-42, 208 (Nimmer again discusses Judge Frank's theoretical copyist with bad
eyesight.).
25 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 205.
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of intent to abridge the big Woolf (the bad Woolf having sprung
adventitiously) prevents a copyrightable abridgement from
resulting."26 Rather than delving into murky questions of
intent, it will be far easier to adapt Nimmer's reasoning using a
slightly different approach. Why not characterize a mistaken
omission as nothing more than a trivial variation? A mistake
that the putative author does not consciously adopt is trivial in
a manner analogous to the way that alphabetical or numeric
order is trivial. The variation is trivial because it was
completely unintentional. The lack of intent, then, does not
stand alone as a dispositive criterion. Instead, the lack of intent
serves as one factor to show why the putative author's
variations are trivial and thus, not copyrightable.
Nimmer presents additional hypothetical scenarios to
support his thesis that an author "must intend to author for a
work of authorship to emerge."27 A more textured analysis is
necessary. Although intent can be a useful factor in
determining whether a work is original, it is rarely, if ever,
dispositive. In addition, it is also important to consider just
what intent means in this context. First, the mere fact that a
putative author subjectively intends to effect variations does
not necessarily make the resulting work original. Nimmer's
hypothetical concerning Sewer's restaurant list illustrates this
point.28 A trier of fact must be willing to evaluate all the
evidence and, if need be, conclude that the variations effected
are merely trivial, and therefore that the work is unoriginal. 29
Second, the fact that a putative author subjectively
intends to recreate or reconstruct a factual work serves as good
evidence that the resulting work is unoriginal. Qimron
illustrates this point. A putative author's intent to reconstruct
facts is strong evidence that the work is unoriginal. While not
dispositive, evidence would have to be strong to overcome this
presumption of unoriginality. Third, the fact that a putative
author does not intend to effect subjective changes or
variations does not necessarily make the resulting work
unoriginal. For example, a painter who tosses paint aimlessly
at a canvass with no particular intent at all is, nevertheless,
ordinarily an author and creates an original work of
2 See id.
V Id. at 204-05.
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
See VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 9, at 854 (discussing the
pros and cons of this type of evidence).
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authorship. And fourth, the fact that a putative author does not
intend to reconstruct a factual work does not necessarily mean
that the resulting work is original.
In each case, the putative author demonstrates the
intent, or lack thereof, to bring about subjective changes and
the intent or lack thereof to reconstruct a factual work. Each is
helpful in analyzing whether the variations are merely trivial
or whether they become meaningful or significant. In either
case, however, intent is not dispositive. The trier of fact is still
free, in the end, to disregard the putative author's testimony
regarding intent and to decide instead that the variations are
either meaningful or trivial, using the putative author's
subjective intent simply as one factor in the calculus of
originality.
The difference between treating a putative author's
subjective intent as entirely dispositive and treating it as a
factor in the calculus of originality is subtle but meaningful. To
illustrate intent to author as the basis for decision-making,
Nimmer offers a hypothetical. First, he proposes an act without
original authorship intent: "After her careless brother breaks
an old Barbie doll, Little Jane throws it into the garbage heap.
There it sits, amidst bananas and other detritus of the
household. By no stretch of the imagination has a
copyrightable event occurred." In contrast, Nimmer offers
Christu:
[T]he magnificent performance artist, decides to go the field of
readymades one better: he buys a Barbie doll, smashes it with a
hammer, perches it amidst banana peels and other household
garbage, and displays the product at the newly refurbished Tate
Gallery. Has a derivative work been created? It would seem so. The
differing intent underlying Little Jane's and Christu's conduct would
seem to vouchsafe their completely different treatment. 1
It is, however, more instructive to consider Christu's intent and
little Jane's lack of intent merely as evidence relating to
originality rather than as dispositive proof. In the case of
Christu, the variations are not trivial. The artist can explain
why his variations are significant.3 2 Little Jane, on the other
hand, cannot explain why her variations are anything but
trivial.
30 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 205.
31 Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted).
See VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 9, at 854.
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Nimmer again invokes Judge Frank's theoretical copyist
with bad eyesight.' First he quotes Frank: "'Having hit upon
such a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as
his and copyright it.' Indeed, even if Christu's inspiration came
from uncopyrightable garbage, his adoption of it imbues it with
protection, because of the magical infusion of intent.""
Nimmer's approach places far too much power in the hands of a
putative author, who, after the fact, could easily fabricate a
tale of subjective intent to prove "authorship." A more sensible
alternative would be to consider soberly such self-serving
testimony.1 After hearing such testimony, a trier of fact may
still deem the intent insufficient to prove originality. For
instance, suppose a putative author claimed to choose a list of
Boston's 100 best restaurants and, by coincidence, it was also
in alphabetical order. The trier of fact could simply say, "I don't
believe that intent alone is sufficient to make the list
copyrightable because it is unoriginal." On the other hand,
presumably, if a person inadvertently switches on his
camcorder and records a series of events, without intent to fix a
work, let alone "to author," he still owns the copyright to the
resulting video. Thus, intent to author neither guarantees nor
denies copyright protection.
In sum, a person's intent to copy (like Qimron's intent to
copy) should be considered strong evidence that what that
person produced is not copyrightable. In such a case, the
putative author's errors must be considered as merely trivial in
the sense that (1) we do not know which parts are errors and
which are not, and (2) on balance any errors that exist are
minor compared to the value of the reconstruction. However,
an intent to author cannot be dispositive of originality (and,
thus, copyrightability) because the trier of fact still must
evaluate whether the putative author's efforts are merely
trivial or whether, despite an intent to author, the putative
author has merely copied.36 Intent may be an important factor,
but our analysis must remain cautious. As the above
hypotheticals showed, although an intent to copy generally
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir.
1951).
Nimmer, supra note 1, at 208 (footnotes omitted).
See VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 9, at 855.
Perhaps subconsciously, like George Harrison. See Bright Tunes Music
Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd sub nom.
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
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indicates that there is no originality, an intent to author does
not always prove originality.
B. Creativity and Variation
It is now well settled United States law that originality
is an essential element of copyright.37 The Copyright Act
provides that "copyright . . . subsists in original works of
authorship . . .38 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the Supreme Court established that originality has
two sub-elements: in order to be original, a work must have
been created independently (i.e., it must not have been copied)
and it must contain some minimal degree of creativity.3
Although the Supreme Court used the term "creativity," the
word is inappropriate. 40 Especially given the assiduous manner
in which Congress avoided making "creativity" an express
element of copyright when writing the 1976 statute, it is
preferable to interpret the Feist creativity requirement as
asking whether the work in question contains some variation
that rises above the level of the trivial. 41 And, as the previous
section illustrated, an author's intent is merely one factor in
assessing whether a variation is trivial. Three recent cases
serve as useful illustrations of this point: (1) Matthew Bender &
Co. Inc. & HyperLaw v. West Publishing Co;42 (2) Bridgeman
Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corporation; and (3) Entertainment
Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., Aerostar
International, Inc."
The factual background of HyperLaw is familiar to
lawyers. West Publishing ("West") publishes the text of state
and federal judicial opinions, taken directly from courts, in a
series of case reporters. Each case report is enhanced with
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
("The sine qua non of copyright is originality.").
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. See also Nimmer, supra note 1, at 195 (Copyright
protection requires only that a work of authorship be nouveau, i.e., new to its creator
or, in the jargon of the field, "independently created," as opposed to being copied from
prior sources. "It is for that reason that Learned Hand conjured up the theoretical
possibility of a 'new' Ode on a Grecian Urn." (footnotes omitted)).
See VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 9, at 822-43.
41 See Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox, 56 U. PIIT. L. REV. 549, 558-
79 (1995).
158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
43 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997).
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"independently composed features,"' such as a syllabus,
headnotes and key numbers. Certain factual data, such as
parallel or alternative citations, attorney information and
subsequent procedural history, are also added to the text.
HyperLaw published the text of judicial opinions from
the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts
of Appeals. HyperLaw then compiled these opinions on two
separate CD-ROMs. HyperLaw, in an effort to expand its CD-
ROM products, planned to copy West's case reports, minus the
independently composed features. HyperLaw sought a
declaratory judgment that its "redacted versions of West's case
reports contain no copyrightable material and thus may be
copied without infringement.' 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, with Judge Jacobs writing for the Court, framed the
issue as "whether West's alterations to the case reports, when
considered collectively, demonstrate sufficient originality and
creativity to be copyrightable."'7 Relying heavily on the decision
in Feist, the court held that the elements of West's case reports
which HyperLaw sought to copy were not copyrightable. In
reaching its conclusion, the court assessed the originality and
creativity underlying the four elements of West's case reports.
First, the court concurred with the district court's
finding that West's enhancements to the captions, courts and
date information were "insubstantial, unoriginal and
uncreative. "' According to the court, the "names of the parties,
the deciding court and the dates of argument and decision are
elementary items, and their inclusion is a function of their
importance, not West's judgment."'9 Second, the court agreed
with the district court's finding that West's selection and
arrangement of attorney information lacked a "modicum of
creativity."5° Quoting Feist, the court found that the names of
attorneys, firms and cities of practice were "entirely 'typical'
and 'garden-variety.'"" Third, the court again agreed with the
district court's finding that West's alteration of opinions to
incorporate subsequent procedural history did not "reflect an
Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d. at 676.
Id. at 678.
47 Id. at 680.
48 Id. at 684.
49 Id. at 683.
50 Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d. at 684.
51 Id.
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exercise of originality or creativity," because of the limitations
in "West's realistic options.5 2 Finally, the court found that
West's parallel or alternate citations, albeit helpful, had the
"cumulative effect" of a "piling up of things that are essentially
obvious or trivial," and therefore, "cannot be said to be
creative.""
Although the Second Circuit used the term "creativity"
to explain its finding that West's reports lacked "originality,"'
reliance on the undefined term was unnecessary. The first two
elements of HyperLaw are unprotectable facts (names of
parties, court, names of attorneys, location of practice) and
therefore are noncopyrightable. And, although West clearly
intended to convey factual information, not subjective,
distinguishable or meaningful variations, the court did not
even broach intent as an issue. Similarly, the inclusion of
procedural history could be understood easily as nonprotectable
under the merger doctrine as it limited "West's realistic,
options. "5The court itself noted that the parallel citations were
"trivial." Thus, the HyperLaw court easily could have based its
decision on grounds of the idea-expression dichotomy and lack
of originality by virtue of "triviality of variation" without any
need to resort to the undefined term, "creativity."
Interestingly, in his discussion of "originality," Nimmer,
referring to Feist and HyperLaw, takes the opportunity to
consider the copyrightability of telephone numbers.56 According
to Nimmer, a telephone number that the telephone company
assigns to an individual is not copyrightable. Although this is
probably true, in his explanation he states: "that phone
number, like West's page numbers, is not an 'antecedent fact';
it springs into existence only by virtue of the putative property
owner's labor."57 He further explains: "A telephone number is
not like a mathematical algorithm or law of nature that lies
around waiting to be discovered . . . ."5' Quite to the contrary,
the entire universe of 7-digit numbers already exists as fact.
Simply because no one has bothered to write all of them down
52Id.
Id. at 688.
64 See, e.g., id. at 680.
56 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d
Cir. 1994); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
56 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 97.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 97 n.479 (quoting ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS
INFORMATION?: FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLIC ACCESS 39 (1994)).
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does not transform someone who does write down any one of
those numbers (or all of those numbers, for that matter) into an
author by virtue of her efforts. That's mathematics (apologies
to Tom Leherer).59 Because of the laws of mathematics, there is
a precise, ascertainable group of 7-digit numbers that exist.
Therefore, each and every 7-digit number is a fact that already
exists. What the phone company does is to correlate that fact
with the name of an individual. Arguably, that random,
computer-generated correlation is simply too trivial to qualify
for copyright protection. Thus, the 7-digit numbers are not
copyrightable because they are pre-existing facts, and the
combination, or assignment, of names with numbers is nothing
more than a trivial variation of that data.
Another important case construing Feist is Bridgeman
Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.' Bridgeman, an English
company with a New York office, acquired reproductions of
public domain works of art owned by museums and other
collections. These reproductions were maintained in
Bridgeman's library and distributed as high-resolution
transparencies and digital files on CD-ROM.61  The
transparencies were provided to clients through licensing
agreements, while the CD-ROMs were provided to clients free
of charge.62 Corel, a Canadian corporation, created and
marketed a set of seven CD-ROMs, which contained "seven
hundred digital reproductions of well known paintings by
European masters. ' Corel asserted that it acquired the
reproductions from slides owned by the president of a dissolved
California corporation, Off the Wall, Inc.' Bridgeman sought
judgment claiming that Corel infringed its copyrights in
approximately 120 of its reproductions.6 Bridgeman's theory
was that:
(1) the owners of the underlying works of art, all of which... are in
the public domain, strictly limit access to those works, (2)
Bridgeman's transparencies . . . are "the only authorized
transparencies of some of these works of art," and (3) "[bly inference
and logical conclusion, the images in Corel's CD-ROMs must be
"9 See TOM LEHRER, THE REMAINS OF TOM LEHRER (Rhino Records 2000).
6o Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 421
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
61 Id. at 423.
62 Id. at 424.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 423 n.1.
Bridgeman, 25 F. Supp. 2d. at 424.
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copies of Bridgeman's transparencies because they have not proved
legal [sic] source."'
The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, with Judge Kaplan writing for the court,
addressed the applicable choice of law, which it viewed as a
"threshold matter."6 7 The court determined that "whether
copyright subsists in Bridgeman's transparencies is a question
of United Kingdom Law."
The United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs and Patent
Act of 1988 ("UK Act") grants copyright protection to "original
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works."69 To meet the
UK's originality requirement, a work "need not be original or
novel in form, but it must originate with the author and not be
copied from another work."70 A derivative work is protected if
"the [author's] skill, judgment and labour transforms the
underlying work in a relevant way."71 In addition, there must
"be some element of material alteration or embellishment
which suffices to make the totality of the work an original
work."72 The court concluded that Bridgeman's transparencies
lacked "sufficient originality to be copyrightable" under the UK
Act.73 In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that
Bridgeman's transparencies are "substantially exact
reproductions of public domain works, albeit in a different
medium."74  The transparencies were "copied from the
66 Id.
6 Id. at 425.
68 Id. at 426. The court writes:
United States law is persuasive in construing English law for two
reasons. First, there is substantial similarity between the originality
requirements of the UK Act and the Copyright Act. As does the UK Act,
the Copyright Act extends protection only to "original works of
authorship". . . .With respect to derivative works, the originality
requirement warrants that there be a distinguishable variation
between the work in which copyright is sought and the underlying
work.... Second, the Privy Council itself has looked to American law
as persuasive authority with respect to copyright originality.
Id. at 427 n.41.
Bridgeman, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 426 (footnote omitted).
71 Id. (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL E. GEILER, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE § 2 [31 [b], at UK-28 (1998) (citations omitted)).
72 Bridgeman, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (footnote omitted).
73 Id. at 427.
74 Id. at 426.
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underlying works without any avoidable addition, alteration or
transformation. 75
To the extent that Bridgeman's images differed from
works in the public domain, arguably, those variations are so
slight that they can be characterized as merely trivial. If one
were to examine the nature of Bridgeman's intent (which the
court did not), more than likely it was to recreate public
domain works as faithfully as possible. Just like Qimron.
Finally, the facts of Entertainment Research Group, Inc.
v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., Aerostar International, Inc.76
are fairly simple. Entertainment Research Group ("ERG")
designed and manufactured three-dimensional "walk-around"
inflatable costumes, which were sold to various companies
where they were used as promotional tools at publicity events.77
ERG's costumes were based upon the companies' cartoon
characters.78 Throughout its sixteen years in the business, ERG
"developed techniques and designs" that "resulted in high-
quality, attractive, durable and comfortable inflatable
costumes."79 ERG maintained that up until the spring of 1991,
it was the "only manufacturer utilizing" such "techniques."8
Defendant Genesis marketed promotional and
advertising devices to various companies, such as General Mills
and Pillsbury. 81 Defendant Aerostar manufactured hot air
balloons, cold air inflatable products and cold air walk-around
costumes.82 ERG and Genesis entered into a business
relationship in which ERG's costumes were sold as promotional
tools to Genesis's customers.8 ERG alleged that Genesis and
Aerostar entered into a secret agreement whereby "Genesis
supplied Aerostar with ERG-made costumes and ERG's
proprietary information so that Aerostar could enter into the
inflatable costume industry and so that Genesis could get itself
a better deal through Aerostar. '84 ERG sued Aerostar for
copyright infringement.
75 Id.
76 122 F.3d 1211, 1211 (9th Cir. 1997).
77 Id. at 1214.
78 Id.
7 Id.
80 Id.
81 Entm't Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1214.
82 Id. at 1214-15.
83 Id. at 1215.
84 Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, with District Judge Rea writing for the court, discussed
the derivative copyright infringement cause of action. In order
to establish copyright infringement the "holder of the copyright
must prove both valid ownership of the copyright and
infringement of that copyright by the alleged infringer. 85 ERG
received copyright registrations for the specific costumes at
issue, thereby establishing prima facie evidence of the validity
of its copyright. An alleged infringer may rebut the statutory
presumption of copyright validity with evidence that disputes
the plaintiffs prima facie case. 86 In ERG, the court determined
that when Aerostar "presented photographs and artwork of the
original copyrighted figures," it "raised a serious question as to
whether ERG's costumes" were "sufficiently 'original' to merit
copyright protection."87 According to the court, this evidence
revealed that the costumes at issue were "quite similar in
appearance to the copyrighted characters" on which the
costumes were based.8 The costumes lacked originality because
they were "copied from another's work."9
In determining whether the costumes were
copyrightable as derivative works, the court applied the Second
Circuit's test from Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.90 The
Durham test contains two prongs:
First, to support a copyright the original aspects of a derivative work
must be more than trivial. Second, the original aspects of a
derivative work must reflect the degree to which it relies on
preexisting material and must not in any way affect the scope of any
copyright protection in that preexisting material. 9'
Before addressing the first prong, the court determined
that "for copyright purposes, costumes would fall under the
category of 'pictorial, graphic and sculptural works' and would
8 Id. at 1217.
Entm't Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1217.
87 Id. at 1218.
88Id.
89Id.
90 Id. at 1219. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1980). ERG argued that the court should apply the Doran test, Doran v. Sunset House
Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961). The ERG court refused to apply this
test. It found that the Doran test "completely" failed to "take into account the rights of
the holder of the copyright for the underlying work," because under this test "if the
form of the underlying work-three-dimensional, two-dimensional, plastic, etc.-are
sufficiently different, then the derivative work is original enough to be copyrightable."
Entm't Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1219.
91 Entm't Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1220 (citing Durham, 630 F.2d at 909).
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be treated as sculptural works."9 Such works receive copyright
protection only "insofar as their form but not their mechanical
or utilitarian aspects are concerned ... and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article."'
The court then focused on whether the "non-functional
aspects of the ERG costumes were sufficiently original."9 The
court determined that "any artistic differences in the costumes"
were "merely trivial," because "decisions that enable one to
reproduce or transform an already existing work into another
medium or dimension-though perhaps quite difficult and
intricate decisions" are not sufficient to "constitute the
contribution of something 'recognizably his own."' 95 ERG argued
that its contributions were more than trivial since the costumes
varied significantly in "proportions and facial expressions from
the original characters" and contained several elements, "Which
were wholly absent" from the originals, such as "the texture of
the costumes and the manner" in which they moved.' The
court rejected this argument, concluding that the "differences
in form, texture and proportionality stemmed from
functional considerations." 7
Finally, turning to the second prong of the Durham test,
the court concluded that because the costumes were "so similar
to the well-known copyrighted characters" upon which they
were based, granting the costumes copyright protection would
"have the practical effect of providing ERG with a de facto
monopoly on all inflatable costumes depicting the copyrighted
characters also in ERG's costumes. '
In sum, then, the court was not compelled to evaluate
originality in terms of "creativity." Rather, it determined that
variations dictated by function were merely trivial and
therefore unoriginal. Thus, ERG instructs us to examine
originality using a standard of "trivial variation" and also
recognizes that variations dictated by functional considerations
92 Id. at 1221.
9 Id.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
95 Id. at 1222.
96 Entm't Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1222-23.
97 Id. at 1223.
98 Id. at 1224.
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(just as variations dictated by alphabetical, numerical, or
chronological order) are trivial and thus not subject to
copyright protection. In addition, as was true in HyperLaw and
Bridgeman, the court was not interested in ERG's intent.
Presumably, ERG's intent was merely to reproduce the logo
characters in a three-dimensional, functional manner. As such,
a court is justified in determining that intent to reproduce is
not an intent to effect subjective or artistic variations on a
preexisting work.
These three cases illustrate that courts need not
examine an author's intent in order to determine whether a
work is original. At most, the cases show that if courts do
consider intent in their analysis of originality, intent may be
only one relevant factor. Additionally, these cases illustrate
that courts need not resort to evaluating "creativity" in order to
determine originality. Only if we define "creativity" as the
imposition of a significant, distinguishable or meaningful (i.e.,
greater than trivial) variation, does the term begin to serve any
useful purpose. Preferably, the federal judiciary will completely
drop the term "creativity" from its copyright vocabulary and
replace it with "distinguishable variation," "meaningful
variation," or "more than trivial variation. "9 This
interpretation is essential to avoid the chaos that will result if
we allow federal judges to invent their own vague or
amorphous definitions of "creativity." The continued use of the
undefined term "creativity" is simply too risky.
II. JOINT AUTHORSHIP
A. Perspective: The Intent Rule of Childress v. Taylor
Intent is essential to joint authorship. The Copyright
Act requires that parties-the joint authors-must intend to
merge their contributions into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.'0° On the surface, then, an argument
can be made that joint authorship could be triggered by
nothing more than two parties intending to merge their
respective contributions. On its face, the statute requires only
an intent to join material (e.g., words and music).1 ' The statute
See SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y
2000); Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
100 17 U.S.C. § 101 (19941).
101 Id.
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does not say that the parties must intend to consider
themselves as "joint authors."'° Under a strict reading of the
statute, if author A writes nine chapters of a ten-chapter book
and author B writes only one chapter, so long as A and B
intended to merge those chapters, and so long as those
chapters are interdependent (under this hypothetical, the
chapters are not inseparable), the authors' intent to merge
should be sufficient to render the resulting book a joint work
and to make A and B joint authors. Although this result
comports with a strict interpretation of the statute, it is just
this type of scenario that has forced judges to invent new rules.
Confronted with circumstances where one author is clearly the
"dominant" author and the other clearly "subordinate, "1°3 judges
resorted to other methods of interpretation and analysis.
Judge Newman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit broke new ground in Childress v. Taylor when
he fashioned the requirement that each author must intend to
be a joint author in order for joint authorship to arise."°4 He did
not state, however, that the authors must intend a legal
conclusion. °5 Because Childress is the wellspring of the current
law on intent and joint authorship, it is necessary, for purposes
of the present discussion, to quote a section of Judge Newman's
opinion at length.
There remains for consideration the crucial aspect of joint
authorship-the nature of the intent that must be entertained by
each putative joint author at the time the contribution of each was
created. The wording of the statutory definition appears to make
relevant only the state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the
finished work-an intention "that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." However,
an inquiry so limited would extend joint authorship status to many
persons who are not likely to have been within the contemplation of
Congress. For example, a writer frequently works with an editor who
102 Id.
103 1 use these terms recognizing that in today's world of political correctness,
the literature does not employ the term "subordinate" but uses instead the term
'nondominant."
104 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991); see Faye Buckalew, Joint Authorship in
the Second Circuit: A Critique of the Law in the Second Circuit Following Childress v.
Taylor and as Exemplified in Thomson v. Larson, 64 BROOK L. REV. 545, 565 (1998)
("The Childress court... added an additional.., intent requirement-the intent on
the part of each collaborator to enter into a legal relationship as joint authors."). See
also Childress, 945 F.2d at 509 ("[the] sharing of rights should be reserved for
relationships in which all participants fully intend to be joint authors."). The Second,
Seventh and Ninth Circuits now follow this discussion.
10" Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
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makes numerous useful revisions to the first draft, some of which
will consist of additions of copyrightable expression. Both intend
their contributions to be merged into inseparable parts of a unitary
whole, yet very few editors and even fewer writers would expect the
editor to be accorded the status of joint author, enjoying an
undivided half interest in the copyright in the published work.
Similarly, research assistants may on occasion contribute to an
author some protectable expression or merely a sufficiently original
selection of factual material as would be entitled to a copyright, yet
not be entitled to be regarded as a joint author of the work in which
the contributed material appears. What distinguishes the writer-
editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from the
true joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both
participants in the venture to regard themselves as joint authors.'
0 6
Interestingly, the legislative history concerning joint
authorship does not lend support to Judge Newman's
interpretation:
[a] work is "joint" if the authors collaborated with each other, or if
each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the
knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the
contributions of other authors as "inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole." The touchstone here is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined
into an integrated unit .... 'w
Judge Leval of the Southern District of New York deserves
partial credit (or blame) for establishing the Childress rule. In
Fisher v. Klein,1 8 he stated: "It is only where that dominant
author intends to be sharing authorship that joint authorship
will result."'°9
Because the Childress rule is central to our current
understanding of joint authorship, and because "[tihe Childress
approach has been endorsed in virtually every subsequent
adjudication of a joint authorship dispute,"1 it is important to
consider it and to explain it at greater length. The Childress
"o Id. at 507.
107 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736-
37 [hereinafter House Report].
108 Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1795 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
109 Id. at 1798. The contract model of objective intent (discussed infra Part
II.C.) analysis suggests that Leval's approach is supportable, so long as we interpret
him to say that joint authorship exists when a reasonable person in the position of the
nondominant author would perceive that the dominant author "intends to be sharing
authorship."
110 See Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator:
Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 227 (2001) (footnote
omitted).
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intent requirement may, in fact, be the most appropriate way
to interpret the copyright statute. Indeed, it makes logical and
common sense that joint authors should agree to be joint
authors at or near the beginning of their collaboration. If the
Childress approach is correct, then we are really asking a
question about contract law. Did the putative joint authors
intend to be bound in a relationship? Did they intend to share
the ownership of the resulting work? Implicitly, then, each
putative author is both offeror and offeree in a bilateral
agreement. For instance, it is as if one says to the other: "If I
contribute an appreciable amount of material to this work, will
you agree to share with me the economic benefits that derive
from it?"
The court in Thomson v. Larson... addressed joint
authorship in similar terms, noting that
each [author] must understand that each one of them has an interest
in the joint product, that is to say, a right to share the proceeds, a
right to control the work and a right to be recognized as the author.
In other words, there must be an intent that there be a sharing of
the indicia of ownership and authorship."2
This description certainly sounds like a contract of joint
authorship.
Professor LaFrance criticized Judge Newman's rule in
Childress:
the opinion proceeds from the unexamined assumption that
Congress could not have intended editors and research assistants to
qualify as co-authors, and then makes the further assumption that
the relationship test is necessary to foreclose this parade of
horribles. Unfortunately, Judge Newman never questioned the
validity of either assumption, and offered no independent reasoning
to bridge this logical gap.'13
Actually, Judge Newman's thesis is nearly self-evident.
Western jurisprudence traditionally has taken the view that
individuals should be entitled to profits based on, or rationally
related to, contributions that they have made to an enterprise.
Given this fundamental notion of fairness, it would be
surprising indeed if Congress intended a nondominant author
ill Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
1 See Buckalew, supra note 104, at 556 (quoting Thomson v. Larson, No. 96-
8876, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13150 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1997) (transcript of unpublished
decision)).
113 Id. at 223.
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(say, one responsible for 5% of a work) to share equally with a
dominant author (say, one who contributed the other 95%).
Copyright law needs to take into account the fact that
many if not most works bear the stamp of more than one
person. Typically, many contributors are responsible for a
work. 14 But perhaps we need not concern ourselves with the
intent of persons such as editors; instead, perhaps we should
presume, based on an originality analysis, that the work of an
editor is not copyrightable because an editor's contributions are
either "trivial" or merely functional,115  therefore not
copyrightable. The insertion and deletion of commas and
semicolons, and correction of capitalization, punctuation,
spelling and grammar should be regarded as trivial in the
copyright sense of the word. Alternatively, editorial
contributions should be regarded as relating to the functional
aspects of writing and therefore not copyrightable.
B. Towards a Definition of "Intent"
We must go further than Childress did to fully
understand the breadth of the intent rule in the context of joint
authorship. Since joint authorship is functionally a contract
between joint authors, we must delineate carefully and
precisely what we mean by "intent." If we do not define "intent,"
we run the risk that we will misinterpret "intent" for purposes
of joint copyright authorship.
American law deals with the notion of intent in a
variety of contexts. For purposes of intent in criminal law, we
are often concerned with a subjective standard. For example,
for theft, murder and rape, a factfinder is charged with
evaluating whether an accused intended certain consequences.
114 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Author Stories: Narrative's Implications for
Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-21
(2001) ("postmodernists argue that no single work manifests creativity and innovation
deriving from a unitary source.") (footnote omitted). In discussing the quandary of joint
authorship, Nimmer recognizes that on many occasions, "innumerable editors, friends,
colleagues, and kibbitzers contribute to the end product, although the listed author is
seldom gracious enough to credit them." Nimmer, supra note 1, at 186. Nimmer
endorses Judge Newman's approach in Childress v. Taylor, noting that "Judge
Newman (writing for the Second Circuit) simply devised a new doctrinal ingredient to
reject it [i.e., the plaintiffs claim ofjoint authorship]: All of the participants in the joint
venture must regard themselves as joint authors." Id. at 186-87. Nimmer summarizes
this to mean, "As a result, researchers, editors and other contributors do not qualify as
'joint author' with the named principal." Id. at 187.
1 Entm't Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211,
1223 (9th Cir. 1997).
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The factfinder must determine whether the accused formed
specific mental conceptions. Although the factfinder is often
limited to objective or circumstantial evidence of criminal
intent, the inquiry actually focuses on discovering what the
accused was thinking when she committed the act. Lawyers
typically refer to this concept of "intent" as "subjective intent."
The Model Penal Code, for example, upon which most
substantive American criminal law is now based, identifies four
mental states that may be used to define criminality." 6 The
commentary to this section makes clear the essentially
subjective nature of intent analysis in the criminal law.
The Model Code's approach to purpose and knowledge is in
fundamental disagreement with the position of the House of Lords in
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith. That case effectively
equated "intent to inflict grievous bodily harm" with what the
defendant as a reasonable man must be taken to have contemplated,
thus erecting an objective instead of a subjective inquiry to
determine what the defendant "intended." In the Code's formulation,
both "purposely" and "knowingly," as well as "recklessly," are meant
to ask what, in fact, the defendant's mental attitude was. It was
believed to be unjust to measure liability for serious criminal
offenses on the basis of what the defendant should have believed or
what most people would have intended.1"7
The Code's default minimum required mental state
heightens this preference for subjective assessment of intent.
Unless a crime is defined to require only negligence or is a
strict liability offense, the minimum required mental state is
"recklessness.""" The goal of the inquiry is to ascertain what
the accused was thinking at the time that he or she committed
an act. This type of intent is relevant to the inquiry addressed
in Part I. In determining whether a work is original, an
author's subjective intent is relevant in determining whether
his variations are trivial or meaningful/significant." 9
On the other hand, in many civil law contexts, contract
law, for example, intent is an entirely different matter. In
particular, contract doctrine holds that parties to a contract
(offeror and offeree) must intend to be bound. Nineteenth
century cases are replete with statements requiring a "meeting
116 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(a)-(d) (1985).
117 See id. § 2.02(2)(a)-(d), cmt.2 at 234-35.
11 Id. § 2.02(3)
119 We asked, for example, what Qimron's intent was when he produced his
version of the Dead Sea Scrolls.
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of the minds" of the parties.1'2 Although Mr. Spock, a Vulcan,
was capable of a "mind-meld" on the 1960s television show Star
Trek, modern American contract doctrine clearly requires no
such extraordinary powers on the part of offeror and offeree.
Instead, modern contract doctrine considers "intent to be
bound" as an objective question. The goal is not to determine
whether a party was subjectively-in his own mind-
intending to be bound. Rather, the goal is to determine whether
his words or conduct are such that a reasonable person in the
other party's position would have perceived that he intended to
be bound. For example, suppose that an offeror thinks to
himself: "I want to sell my car to this guy (the offeree) for $500.
I really, really do. I really do." But if he states his offer in a
sarcastic or joking tone of voice, a reasonable person in the
position of the putative offeree would perceive an intent to joke
rather than an intent to be bound. Thus, although the offeror
may have subjectively intended to be bound (to make an offer),
the sarcastic or joking tone of his voice (the objective criteria by
which the offeree judges an offeror's intent) could easily lead a
reasonable person in this situation to perceive that the offeror
was merely joking, and not intending to be bound. The
fundamental analysis in issues of intent to be bound in contract
law depends on whether a reasonable person in the position of
the offeree would perceive that the offeror (based on his words
and conduct) intended to be bound and whether a reasonable
person in the position of the offeror would perceive that the
offeree (also, based on his words and conduct) intended to be
bound.
Contract law, by definition, requires mutuality of
assent. Two or more persons voluntarily acquire rights and
assume duties. Because parties are doing both-acquiring
rights and assuming duties-contract law is reticent to grant
rights and foist duties onto a party unless his words and
conduct are such that a reasonable person in the position of the
other party would have perceived that he intended to be bound
(i.e., that one intended to acquire those rights and assume
those duties). The mutuality of assent to contract is key.
Because, by definition, contracts contemplate future
performance, each party ought to be entitled to rely on the
other's promises. Once bound, each party should be able to
m See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contract, 76
YALE L.J. 939, 943-44 (1967).
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change his position or order his affairs with third parties in
reliance on the manifest intent to be bound of his fellow
contracting party. Each should be entitled to expend time,
energy, effort and money on the assumption that the other
contracting party will keep his end of the bargain. Such
reliance is the principal reason why the objective theory of
contract is so dear to modem American contract law.121 We
believe, as is also true in tort law,' that a party ought to be
bound, and ought to be legally considered as having intended to
be bound, if his words and conduct are such that a reasonable
person in the position of the other party would have perceived
that he intended to be bound. The objective theory of contract
intent protects the perceiving party's interest. If, for example,
A's words and conduct are such that a reasonable person in the
position of B would perceive that A was making a legitimate
offer to sell something, then contract theory validates B's
reasonable perception that A intended to be bound. If B then
takes steps in reliance on A's words and conduct, contract law
protects B by enforcing A's promise to sell. Of course the
obverse is equally true. If B's words and conduct are such that
a reasonable person in the position of A would perceive that B
intended to accept A's offer, then contract law validates and
protects A's reasonable perception of B's intent to be bound.
This theory actually operates to protect extremely
practical interests. A fundamental tenet at work here is that
contract law (American civil law jurisprudence, for that matter)
typically only expects people to conform their conduct to that of
a reasonable person.' 23 So, if a reasonable person would
perceive that the other intended to be bound, that is all that we
care about. We do not ask contracting parties to be mind
readers. We merely ask them to act like reasonable people.
Understanding how contract theory treats "intent to be
bound" is instructive regarding our understanding of intent in
an analysis of joint authorship. As suggested above, joint
authorship in copyright is analogous in many respects to
forming a contract. Copyright law provides that joint authors
acquire certain rights and also that they assume certain duties.
For example, each joint author is entitled to an undivided half
ownership interest in the copyright. Each joint author may sell
121 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.6-3.9 (3d ed. 1999).
For example, tort law infuses the notion of a reasonable person in its
analysis of proximate cause.
Strict products liability in tort law is a notable exception.
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or license the copyright without the permission of his fellow
joint authors. Each joint author must, however, account to his
fellow joint authors for a pro rata share of any profits (50%-
50%, in the case of two joint authors). 24 Significant and serious
legal consequences flow from the characterization of a work as
a joint work. Thus, it would be strange, indeed, if one joint
author (A) had contributed only 5% of a work and the other (B)
had contributed 95%, and yet copyright law bestowed on A-by
virtue of his joint authorship-all of the rights and privileges
of joint authorship, namely a full one-half interest in all
economic proceeds derived from the exploitation of the work in
the marketplace. A reasonable person is unlikely to so
conclude.
As suggested above, 12 it is doubtful that Congress
intended this result. Presumably, Congress did not mean for
the language, to wit, "intending to merge their contributions
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole" to
create a contract of joint authorship in cases where reasonable
persons would not have perceived that each other were
intending to be bound. Arguably, reasonable persons know
that, absent an express agreement to the contrary, they must
contribute a sufficient amount or degree to a work in order to
be entitled to reap half of the profits from the work.12 It is
precisely this concern that led Judge Newman to fashion the
rm See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 6.12 (2001). Although the legislative history really does not support the
position that joint authors must intend to be joint authors, it does support the theory
that joint authors need not be considered, in every case, to own precisely one-half of the
copyright as tenants in common. The House Report states that joint authors are
"coowners of copyright ... treated generally as tenants in common." See H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476 (emphasis added). The qualifier "generally" does leave the door open for some
flexibility in interpretation. Thus, if a court was to decide to characterize a
nondominant author as a "limited joint author" with lesser rights than a "full joint
author," presumably it could do so. An alternative approach to resolve this issue would
be to decide that a contributing author does not have to be considered a joint author.
Indeed, in many instances of nondominant authors, that will be the case. A
contributing author will, under this interpretation, be deemed to have granted a non-
exclusive license to the dominant author but he (i.e., the nondominant author) may be
entitled to restitution for his contribution. See Kwall, supra note 114, at 38 ("The
Seventh Circuit observed that the co-author of a copyrighted work can make a
unilateral decision to license the work, subject to an accounting to the other co-authors)
(citing Weinsten v. Univ. of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1092 (7th Cir. 1987)). The court also
noted that co-authors can make changes in a work and publish the original or the
revision." (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
See supra pp. 142-46.
The moral of the children's fable of the Little Red Hen cannot have been
lost on Congress.
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Childress rule. Arguably, a reasonable person would not
interpret another's mere collaboration as acquiescence to a 50-
50 contract of joint authorship. If A contributes 5% and B
contributes 95%, a reasonable person in A's shoes should not
perceive B's conduct (i.e., his mere collaboration and conscious
desire to merge his 95% with A's 5%) as evidence of intent on
B's part to share ownership of the copyright 50-50 with A.
12
Thus, although on its face the statute merely states that
joint authorship depends on the intent of the parties to merge
their contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole, it strains our imagination to conclude that
Congress meant to force parties into a contract of joint
authorship/co-ownership absent an objective manifestation of
intent to be bound on the part of each putative joint author.
Admittedly, an objective inquiry will be more burdensome than
merely asking about an intent to merge contributions. But
arguably, fairness outweighs efficiency on this matter.2
Hence, to supply muscle to the bones of the Childress
intent requirement, a determination of joint authorship ought
to rely on a contract-like interpretation of intent: an objective
manifestation of intent to be bound. The question must turn on
whether a reasonable person in the position of each putative
joint author perceives that the other is intending to be bound
by the Copyright Act's terms of joint authorship (i.e., creating
co-ownership). Absent express words detailing such an
agreement, the conduct of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances will be instructive to aid in this inquiry.
C. A Contract Model of Objective Intent
1. Initial Perspectives & Illustrative Cases
There is a need to establish an analysis that can offer
realistic criteria for determining joint authorship and for
allocating rights among contributors who do not rise to the
m See Buckalew, supra note 104, at 567 ("In Childress, one would probably
not expect a reasonable playwright to think that her collaborator was acting as a joint
author, nor would one expect Childress reasonably to believe that she was a joint
author with Taylor. Childress' contributions were minimal and sketchy at best.").
' LaFrance notes the possibility of adopting "a more flexible rule.., under
which authorship would be allocated according to the relative amount of each party's
contribution to the total creative effort. Such a rule, however, would burden the courts
with extensive fact-finding and require them to exercise . . . aesthetic judgments .. .
LaFrance, supra note 110, at 257 (footnote omitted).
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level of "joint authors."'2 Principles of contract law provide a
fairly complete framework for analyzing the existence, nature
and the scope of joint authorship. This section examines three
post-Childress cases which serve as helpful illustrations for the
contract model of objective intent: Thomson v. Larson,13 °
Aalmuhammed v. Lee,' 3'and Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins.
13 2
In 1992, Playwright Jonathan Larson was in the process
of developing and revising the script for his musical, Rent, in
hopes that the New York Theatre Workshop ("NYTW') would
produce it. On at least two occasions, the artistic director of
NYTW urged Larson to "allow NYTW to hire a playwright or a
book writer to help revamp the storyline and narrative
structure of the play."'33 Larson "adamantly and steadfastly"
refused on both occasions, while "consistently emphasizing his
intention" to be the sole author of Rent.'3
Three years later in May 1995, with Larson's
permission, the NYTW hired Lynn Thomson as a dramaturg to
assist Larson in "clarifying the storyline of the musical."
Thomson's contract with the NYTW provided that her
"responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to: Providing
dramaturgical assistance and research to the playwright and
director."" As compensation, the NYTW agreed to pay
Thomson $2,000 and credit her as dramaturg. 3' The contract
was silent regarding copyright interests and ownership.'"
On January 24, 1996, just a few weeks before the play's
opening, Larson died from an aortic aneurysm. 39 Rent opened
on Broadway in April and was "an astounding critical, artistic
See Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 964, 969 (1999) ("In the absence of
congressional guidance, courts should devise a clearer and more comprehensive joint
authorship rule in the near future."). The contract model of objective intent is designed
to provide just such an analytical framework. See id. at 968-69 ("Though contract
doubtless plays an important role in allocating copyright interests between
collaborators, copyright law must provide a clear default rule.") (footnotes omitted).
The contract model of objective intent proposed in this article is an effort to provide
such a default rule, actually using contract principles.
130 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
131 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1999).
132 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
Thomson, 147 F.3d at 197.
134 Id.
"Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
1 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 197.
139 Id. at 198.
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and commercial success."'40 Later, Thomson filed suit against
Larson's heirs, "claiming that she was a co-author of Rent and
that she had never assigned, licensed, or otherwise transferred
her rights."4 ' The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that "Thomson was
not a joint author of Rent and dismissed the remainder of
Thomson's complaint."4
On appeal, the Second Circuit, with Judge Calabresi
writing for the court, framed the issue as "whether Rent
qualifies as a statutory joint work,' co-authored by Thomson."'"
Relying heavily on the decision in Childress v. Taylor, the court
upheld the district court's ruling that "Larson lacked the
requisite intent to accept Lynn Thomson as a co-author of
Rent."'4 The Court applied Childress' two-pronged test where
"a co-authorship claimant bears the burden of establishing that
each of the putative co-authors (1) made independently
copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended
to be co-authors."" The court focused primarily on the second
prong.
Under Childress, the parties must "entertain in their
minds the concept of joint authorship."'" Evidence of this
necessary mutual intent includes "factual indicia of ownership
and authorship, such as how a collaborator" regards oneself "in
relation to the work in terms of billing and credit,
decisionmaking, and the right to enter contracts."47 In its
analysis of these factors, the Thomson court focused only on
evidence of Larson's intent, when it agreed with the lower
court's determination that Larson "retained and intended to
retain at all times sole decision-making authority."'"8
Furthermore, "the November agreement between Larson and
the NYTW expressly stated that Larson had final approval
over all changes to Rent and that all such changes would
become Larson's property."49 Finally, as to billing and the right
to enter contracts, the court found that the evidence indicated a
140 Id.
141 Id.
4' Id. at 199.
143 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 196.
144 Id. at 206-07.
' Id. at 200.
'4 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991).
147 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201.
148 Id. at 203.
149 Id.
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"lack of intent on Larson's part to make Thomson a co-
author." ° Larson had sole billing as author, and had "entered
into written agreements with third parties as sole author."5'
The second case, Aalmuhammed v. Lee, addressed
similar issues. Jefri Aalmuhammed assisted actor Denzel
Washington and director Spike Lee in the filming of Malcolm
X, which was based on the book, The Autobiography of Malcolm
X.152 Aalmuhammed knew a great deal about the life of
Malcolm X and Islam, "having previously written, directed, and
produced a documentary film about Malcolm X."'m He claimed
that he "reviewed the shooting script" and "suggested extensive
script revisions." Although Lee used some of Aalmuhammed's
suggestions in the final version of the film, others were filmed
but edited from the film. Furthermore, Aalmuhammed claimed
that he
directed Denzel Washington and other actors while on the set,
created at least two entire scenes with new characters, translated
Arabic into English for subtitles, supplied his own voice for voice-
overs, selected the proper prayers and religious practices for the
characters, and edited parts of the movie during post production.5
No contractual relationship existed between the parties, but
Aalmuhammed expected compensation for his work. He
received $25,000 from Lee and $100,000 from Washington.'56
Before the film's November 1992 release,
Aalmuhammed requested a writing credit as a co-writer of the
film. 1 v' His request was denied and he was credited "far down
the list" as an "Islamic Technical Consultant." Three years
later, in November 1995, the U.S. Copyright Office approved
Aalmuhammed's application in which he claimed to be a co-
creator, co-writer and co-director of the film. He was granted a
Certificate of Registration, but the Copyright Office informed
him that "his claims conflict with previous registrations of the
film."59 Aalmuhammed then brought suit seeking declaratory
150 Id. at 204.
151 Id.
12 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1999).
153 Id. at 1229.
15 Id. at 1229-30.
15 Id. at 1230.
156 Id.
157 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1230.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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relief, an accounting under the Copyright Act, and a claim in
quantum meruit.1'6 He argued that the film was a joint work of
which he was a co-author, making him a co-owner in the
copyright. His claim extended to the whole work rather than
his own contributions.
161
The Ninth Circuit, with Judge Kleinfeld writing for the
court, framed the issue as "whether Aalmuhammed was an
author of a 'joint work."'1 62 For a work to qualify as a joint work
there "must be (1) a copyrightable work, (2) two or more
'authors,' and (3) the authors must intend their contributions to
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole."16 The court recognized Malcolm X as a
copyrightable work, which was intended by all to be a unitary
whole.16' Furthermore, the court pointed out that
Aalmuhammed
made substantial and valuable contributions to the movie, including
technical help, such as speaking Arabic to the persons in charge of
the mosque in Egypt, scholarly and creative help, such as teaching
the actors how to pray properly as Muslims, and script changes to
add verisimilitude to the religious aspects of the movie."
However, according to the court, these contributions did not
"result in copyrightable contribution."l' Aalmuhammed's
evidence that he "rewrote several specific passages of dialogue
that appeared in Malcolm X, and that he wrote scenes relating
to Malcolm X's Hajj pilgrimage that were enacted in the
movie," presented a "genuine issue of fact as to whether"
Aalmuhammed made a "copyrightable contribution.""
The court then focused its attention on the element of
authorship. Authorship, according to the court, "is not the same
thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution.""
In defining the term "author," the court turned to the Supreme
Court's definition in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
160 The quantum meruit claim was remanded for further proceedings, because
the question before this court was limited to which state's statute of limitations
applied. Id. at 1237.
161 Id. at 1230.
16 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1231.
163 Id.
164 Id.
166 Id.
166 Id.
167 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1231-32.
168 Id. at 1232.
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Sarony.1" In Burrow-Giles, the term author "involves
originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master
mind, the thing which is to be protected; the man who really
represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or
imagination."' 70 According to the Lee court, when determining
an "author" of a film, "so many people might qualify as an
'author' if the question were limited to whether they made a
substantial creative contribution that that test would not
distinguish one from another."17' The definition of a film author,
absent "a contract to the contrary, would generally limit
authorship to someone at the top of the screen credits,
sometimes the producer, sometimes the director, possibly the
star, or the screenwriter-someone who has artistic control."72
Absent a contract, the court suggested three factors to
determine joint authorship. First, "an author 'superintends' the
work by exercising control . . . a person 'who has actually
formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and
arranging the place where the people are to be." 173 This control
factor in "many cases will be the most important."74 Second, did
the "putative coauthors make objective manifestations of a
shared intent to be coauthors, as by denoting the
authorship[?] " 75 Third, "the audience appeal of the work turns
on both contributions and 'the share of each in its success
cannot be appraised."1
76
In applying the first and second factors to Lee, the court
found that Aalmuhammed "did not at any time [superintend]
the work."177 He "'was not the person who 'actually formed the
picture by putting the persons in position, and arranging the
place." 78 While he made "extremely helpful recommendations,"
Lee "was not bound to accept any of them."79 In short,
Aalmuhammed "lacked control" over the film, and "absence of
control is strong evidence of the absence of co-authorship."' 8o
16 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884).
170 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1233 (quotations omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1234.
174 Id.
17 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1234.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1235.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1235.
[Vol. 68: 1
JOINTAUTHORSHIP
Also, neither party "made any objective manifestations of an
intent to be coauthors.""1 The court held there was "no genuine
issue of fact as to Aalmuhammed's co-authorship of Malcolm X
as a joint work."182
Finally, Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins8 further
illustrates joint authorship tests. Jonathan Morrill filmed a
music video entitled Video Marked for Billy Corgan and his
band, The Marked.l" The promotional video was played at
clubs where the band performed. Some years later, Corgan's
new band, The Smashing Pumpkins, released a ninety-minute
video entitled Vieuphoria, which included about forty-five
seconds of short clips taken from Video Marked.18 Morrill
brought suit alleging that his copyright registration was
evidence of his sole ownership of the copyright for Video
Marked." He further alleged that The Smashing Pumpkins
infringed his copyright by using portions of his video in
Vieuphoria. In response, Corgan contended that he was a joint
author of Video Marked and was not "liable for infringing the
copyright of a work he co-owns."187
The United States District Court for the Central
District of California, with Judge Moreno writing for the Court,
followed the Lee court's test for joint authorship." The
Smashing Pumpkins court found that Video Marked was a
copyrightable work intended to "serve as a unitary whole.""
Furthermore, Morrill's "filming and editing of the video and
Corgan's performance and composition of the songs, satisfy the
requisite level of copyrightable expression necessary to support
a claim of joint authorship."' 90
181 Id. The film studio, Warner Brothers, required Lee to sign a "work for. hire"
agreement, "so that even Lee would not be co-author and co-owner with Warner
Brothers." Id. The court reasoned that it "would be illogical to conclude that Warner
Brothers, while not wanting to permit Lee to own the copyright, intended to share
ownership" with Aalmuhammed. Id.
182 Id. at 1236.
1 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
14 Id. at 1121.
185 Id.
18 Morrill did not register until 1998, twelve years after the video's initial
publication. Under § 401 of the Copyright Act, registration is prima facie evidence of
the validity of the copyright only if it was registered within five years after first
publication of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1996).
187 Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.
188 Id. at 1123.
18 Id.
190 Id.
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The court then focused on the Lee factors for
determining joint authorship:
(1) whether the purported author controls the work and is "the
inventive or master mind who creates, or gives effect to the idea"...
(2) whether the "putative coauthors make objective manifestations of
shared intent to be coauthors," . . . and (3) whether "the audience
appeal of the work turns on both contributions and the share of each
in its success cannot be appraised."191
Applying these factors, the court found that the first factor
favored a "finding of joint authorship."19 Morrill's "filming,
editing, and producing may have helped shape and present The
Marked's music for its audience," but "without the music itself
Video Marked would not exist."1" Corgan and his band "wrote
and performed the songs filmed by Morrill."'" Therefore, they
had "sole control over the writing and the performing of the
video's music."1%
According to the court, the second and third factors also
suggested joint authorship. Morrill's "words and behavior"
evidenced "an intent to be co-authors."" Morrill described the
video "as a work 'created with Corgan and his band.'"19 In his
deposition, Morrill referred to the video as a "'collaboration'
between himself and Corgan." 1" The third factor, audience
appeal, rested "both on the video's visual aspects and on the
composition and performance of the music."19 Therefore, the
court held that Corgan was a joint author of the video and
could not be "liable for copyright infringement based on his use
of Video Marked in The Smashing Pumpkins' video,
Vieuphoria. " "
2. Implied in Fact and Implied in Law Contracts
Contract law distinguishes between an "implied in fact"
contract and a contract designated as "implied in law." An
implied in fact contract exists when parties intend to be bound
191 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
19 Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. (quoting Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000)).
19 Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1125.
20 Id. at 1126.
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but their intent is implied from their conduct or the
surrounding circumstances rather than overt words or
language. "A contract, implied in fact, is an actual contract
which arises where the parties agree upon the obligations to be
incurred, but their intention, instead of being expressed in
words, is inferred from their acts in light of the surrounding
circumstances." 21 "An implied contract is an agreement which
legitimately can be inferred from the intention of the parties as
evidenced by the circumstances and 'the ordinary course of
dealing and the common understanding of men."" Professor
Farnsworth articulated the general rule that a contract "that
results from conduct is described as 'implied in fact."m The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "[a] promise
... may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."2 Comment
A to the Restatement (Second) states:
Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction
involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but merely in the
mode of manifesting assent. Just as assent may be manifested by
words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to
make a promise may be manifested in language or by implication
from other circumstances, including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance.26
It is virtually obvious, then, that absent an express contract of
joint authorship, many joint authorship cases may be resolved
by simply asking whether the putative joint authors created an
implied in fact contract of joint authorship. The objective
manifestations of the putative authors' intent are critical to
this determination.2
21 In re Home Prot. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 17 A.2d 755, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1941).
2w Martin v. Little, Brown & Co., 450 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (quoting
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 486 (1857)).
FARNSWORTH, supra note 121, §§ 3.10.
2D4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1979).
2M Id. § 4 cmt. a.
Professor Kwall criticizes an objective test of joint authorship, saying, 'the
line between subjective and objective indicia of co-authorship can be unclear in many
situations." Kwall, supra note 114, at 56. Professor Kwall urges that courts adopt a
joint authorship standard of "meaningful collaboration." Id. at 64. This "meaningful
collaboration" standard is painfully vague. Kwall gives no real guidance, factors, or
analytical framework for deciding when an author has made a "meaningful
collaboration." She does, however, make two points that actually support the contract
model of objective intent more than her own meaningful collaboration: (1) "of course,
such an open-ended conception of joint authorship may cause concern that dominant
authors will lose ground to contributors who feel a real, yet unreasonable level of
investment in the final product." Id. at 62. Clearly, under the contract model of
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Unlike criminal law, which emphasizes and often relies
upon an inquiry into the subjective state of a criminal's mind, °7
contract law allows contracting parties to evaluate respective
risks and plan their own future conduct, based upon reasonable
expectations shaped by the objective manifestations of intent
(and the promises implicit in those manifestations) of both
parties. The analogy to joint authorship is evident: courts
should consider the interaction between collaborators as
relevant to the objective manifestations of the parties' intent
regarding joint authorship. °" Contracting parties must be able
to rely on the objective indicia of intent. An implied in fact
contract of joint authorship need be no different.2"
Joint authorship is probably best understood as an
implied in fact contract. The Copyright Act provides that joint
authors must intend to combine their contributions into
objective intent, to the extent that a nondominant author's perceptions regarding the
nature of her authorship are "unreasonable," a court would have to dismiss those
feelings as irrelevant. Only the reasonable perceptions of the putative joint authors can
operate as indicia of joint authorship.
(2) [Clourts can look to industry customs in determining whether the
level of investment of a particular putative joint author feels is
reasonable in a given situation. For example, the custom in academia is
that contributions of research assistants and the commentary of
colleagues are gratefully acknowledged by the author, but joint
authorship does not result from these efforts alone.
Id. at 63 (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000)). To be sure,
no system is perfect. But there are logical reasons for treating this issue in a manner
analogous to a contract issue, requiring the objective manifestations of the parties'
intent to be bound.
2W See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 116.
See Buckalew, supra note 104, at 577 ("The interaction between
collaborators should be factored into a consideration of whether or not they should be
regarded as joint authors.").
2W One commentator explains:
The court would next examine the intent of each party, applying the
reasonable person standard rather than the purely subjective standard
applied in Thomson. For example, in addition to the parties' statements
of intent, the court would consider, on one side, whether a reasonable
person would use the work of another in the manner in which it was
used and not expect the other person to receive authorship status for
that contribution. On the other side, the court would consider whether
a reasonable person making such a contribution would expect to be
considered an author. This standard would prevent the granting of joint
authorship status when the relationship between the contributors is
such that the reasonable person would not expect it, as, for example, in
the usual writer-editor or research assistant-author relationship. In
addition, this standard would also prevent denial of joint authorship
status when one party unreasonably believes herself to be the sole
creator of a work or when one party is falsely led to believe it would be
accorded joint authorship status when the other party never truly
intended to do so.
Id. at 581.
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inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. In
many cases where the contributions of each putative joint
author are equal or nearly equal (e.g., 50%-50% in the case of
two contributors), there is no problem. Problems tend to arise
(for example in the instance of two putative joint authors) as
one contributor's contribution rises well above 50% and the
other's drops to well below 50%. The further away from a 50%-
50% split that the contributions go, the more unjust it strikes
us (as reasonable persons) to allow the less significant
contributor (the nondominant contributor) to share equally as a
copyright co-author (sharing an undivided half interest in the
entire copyright along with the dominant author). So, the
difficult cases often arise when the contributions of the
contributors (i.e., the putative joint authors) are disparate or
disproportionate.
To take this issue one step further, assume, for purposes
of illustration, that two putative joint authors collaborate to
write a book. If the contribution of each is roughly equal, a
reasonable person in the position of each would probably
assume that the other intended joint authorship. As the
contribution of each becomes less proportionate, say 60%-40%,
reasonable persons might begin to question whether the other
was genuinely contemplating joint authorship. As the
respective contributions approach 70%-30%, reasonable
persons will become even less likely to perceive that the other
would acquiesce to sharing equally the copyright as joint
authors. The proportionate amount of the contribution of each
putative joint author is a significant factor in determining
whether reasonable persons would perceive an intent on the
part of the other to create joint authorship.
The contract model of objective intent ensures that joint
authorship arises if a reasonable person in the position of the
nondominant contributor, based on the objective
manifestations of intent evinced by the dominant author and
the surrounding facts and circumstances, would have perceived
the collaboration as joint authorship.21 ° Quite obviously, the
more equal the contributions are, the less likely putative joint
authors will be to bicker over the apportionment of copyright
21 See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 224 ("This hierarchy of intent requires
the court to deny joint work status even in situations in which both parties make
substantial (even if unequal) copyrightable contributions with the intent to merge
these contributions into a unitary work, and the nondominant contributor perceives
their collaboration as joint authorship.").
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ownership and profits.21' It seems sensible to assume that
authors need not make exactly equal contributions in order for
them to be joint authors for purposes of copyright law.
Reasonable persons often are willing to share equally
ownership, risk management and profits in a joint enterprise
even if each does not contribute exactly 50%. This statement
may reflect human nature, and its truth may be attributed to a
number of factors. For example, collaborators may be friends,
or may develop a friendship during their collaboration. Thus,
the multi-faceted, intangible aspects of friendship may
contribute to a dominant author's willingness to share the
copyright equally with a nondominant author. A dominant
author may feel that a nondominant author's contributions,
though small, are so significant in the overall enterprise that
the dominant author would be unable to complete the work
without the help of the nondominant author. This feeling-"I
couldn't have done it without you"-is frequently sufficient to
incite emotions of generosity and a willingness to share
copyright ownership 50-50. A dominant author may simply not
wish to "sweat the details" of apportioning ownership and
profits on a mathematical basis. Thus, a dominant author may
be flexible enough to allow a nondominant author to share
copyright ownership and profits 50-50.
Since joint authors are deemed tenants in common and
are entitled to receive half of all profit derived from exploiting
the copyright and to grant licenses to the copyrighted work
without the permission of fellow joint authors, 12 at some point
along the continuum of relative contributions (60%-40%, 70%-
30%, 80%-20%) copyright law must contemplate that
reasonable persons simply will not perceive themselves (and
one another) as joint authors.213 As the Seventh Circuit noted,
"To be a joint author, an assistant or collaborator must
contribute significant copyrightable material."2 4 A logical
211 See Buckalew, supra note 104, at 575 ("In a case in which contributions are
more equally balanced .... reliance upon the distorted subjective belief of one author,
without any exploration of the other author's understanding of the relationship, or of
that other author's intent, would lead to great inequity.").
212 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 124, §§ 6.08-6.12.
213 For some reason, Buckalew seems to think that "a reasonable person
standard" does not also take into account "the relative proportion of their
contributions." Buckalew, supra note 104, at 581-82. It seems preferable to consider the
relative proportions of the parties' contributions as an important factor in determining
the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties.
214 Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.2d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1997).
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interpretation of this statement is that the "significant" amount
of copyrightable material should be enough that a reasonable
person would consider herself a joint author. Concomitantly,
her fellow authors, or to be precise, reasonable persons in the
shoes of her fellow authors, would also perceive her to be a joint
author, sharing copyright ownership. Indeed, a contribution's
significance is an entirely logical factor to consider in assessing
joint authorship. The more significant the contribution a
putative joint author makes, the more likely it is that a
reasonable person would consider himself a joint author, and
the more likely it is that his fellow co-authors would consider
him likewise.2 15 Up to that particular "vanishing point" (i.e., the
point where the contributions of putative joint authors are so
disproportionate that reasonable persons would be deemed
neither to have contemplated nor perceived the other person as
having intended joint authorship), contract theory would
consider the parties to be joint authors by virtue of an implied
in fact contract. In cases where parties make roughly equal
contributions, the parties' conduct implies that they intended
to be joint authors. Once the level of disparity between the
contributions goes beyond that vanishing point, however,
contract law instructs that we no longer have an implied in fact
contract, because the conduct of the parties (i.e., the extreme
disproportionality of the respective contributions) indicates
that there was no implied agreement to be joint authors.
Before proceeding further, we must briefly explore the
significance of the qualitative proportions of contributions
made by putative joint authors. It is unreasonable to assume
that Congress intended to force joint authorship onto a
dominant author when the nondominant author's contribution
is so disproportionately small that a reasonable person in the
position of the dominant author would not have agreed to share
the copyright on a 50-50 basis. For purposes of this preliminary
discussion only, let us assume that-in the case of two
putative joint authors-we can all agree that, once a
nondominant author's contribution dips to a level below 20%, a
reasonable person in the position of the dominant author would
not intend to be bound as a 50-50 joint author. This analysis
probably leads to the same answer whether we consider the
215 See id. ("It would be odd for a senior professor to list a graduate student's
name before his own if the student had contributed nothing more to the article than
the usual assistance that a research assistant provides."). See also LaFrance, supra
note 110, at 234.
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dominant author the offeror and the nondominant author the
offeree, or vice versa. At the risk of stating the obvious,
consider the following. If we agree, merely for the purposes of
this preliminary discussion and illustration, that the
"vanishing point" is 80%-20%, then the following explanation
and argumentation is instructive. Assume A contributes 80%
and B contributes 20%. A reasonable person in the position of B
would not perceive, in the absence of other facts, that A would
offer a 50-50 share of the copyright ownership to B. A
reasonable person in the position of A would not perceive that
B would actually offer to share the copyright ownership 50-50
(presumably A would laugh in B's face at such a suggestion).
Thus, disproportionality of contribution can be a significant,
objective factor in assessing whether putative joint authors
intend to be joint authors, sharing the copyright ownership 50-
50, resulting in an implied in fact contract.
Where no implied in fact contract exists, contract law
suggests that we may, nevertheless, treat the apportionment of
contributions as having created an implied in law contract.
Contracts implied in fact must be distinguished from contracts
implied in law. The Restatement (Second) notes: "Quasi-
contracts have often been called implied contracts or contracts
implied in law; but, unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are
not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake
the performance in question, nor are they promises. They are
obligations created by law for reasons of justice."16 The theory
of quasi contract-or a contract implied in law-recommends
that the nondominant contributor (say, a contributor who has
written 15% of a book) will be entitled to restitution on the
basis that, if he were denied his 15%, the dominant author
would be unjustly enriched by virtue of the nondominant
contributor's contribution.
If a nondominant author's contribution is so minor that
he is not considered a joint author by means of an implied in
fact contract, he may still be entitled to restitution by means of
an implied in law contract, under a quasi contract theory, for
the value by which the dominant author is enriched by the
nondominant author's contribution. A contributor whose
contribution is copyrightable but not substantial enough to
make him a joint author is still, nevertheless, considered an
216 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. b (1997).
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author. The term "contributing author" may be appropriate to
describe such an author.
Here contract remedial theory rescues copyright law
from a dilemma. Justice is preserved on two fronts. First, the
dominant author retains control over his work, unimpeded by
the nondominant author's whims and fancy. Second, the
nondominant author is compensated for his efforts. Restitution
serves a valuable purpose precisely because it prevents unjust
enrichment and compensates an author for the value of his
contribution.
Taking this concept one step further, it is possible to
imagine a situation where the nondominant contributor's
contribution is so minor that the law should treat it as "trivial"
and thus, not copyrightable at all. 18 In that case, arguably, the
nondominant contributor should not even be entitled to
restitution. Presumably, contributions that are so trivial as to
be considered uncopyrightable also are so trivial that the law
should not consider it unjust for the dominant author to retain
their value without compensating the nondominant contributor
(in the absence of an express agreement between them for such
compensation-as may often be the case between a copy editor
and an author). In these instances, trivial contributions
properly may be deemed gifts given to the dominant author.
Roman law principles support the view that a
nondominant contributing author whose contributions,
although copyrightable, are too insignificant to allow him to
qualify as a joint author, should be entitled to restitution in
quantum meruit under the theory of an implied in law
contract. The Roman law of accessio is instructive. When two
properties that were owned by different persons were
inseparably merged, Roman law provided that the owner of the
217 For example, in Thomson v. Larson, Thomson asked for a 16% royalty.
According to her, 48% of Rent was "new" (i.e., the part that she had worked on). Her
theory was that she was entitled to 50% of 48% (by virtue of being joint author-half of
48%), but discounted by 33% because she had contributed to only two of the three
components of Rent (i.e., she contributed to the words and lyrics but not the music).
Thus, her royalty formula was (.5 x .48) x .666 = .16. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195,
198 n.ll (2d Cir. 1998). Generally speaking, this is precisely the type of situation that
an implied in law contract is designed to resolve. A contract model of objective intent
would treat someone like Thomson as a contributing author but not as a joint author.
Thus, she would, presumptively, be entitled to restitution for her 16% (assuming that
the court bought into her figures). In Thomson's case, however, because she contracted
to perform her services for separate consideration, arguably, a court should hold that
she is only entitled to the amount to which she agreed by contract. This, of course,
would be subject to the application of the parol evidence rule.
218 See supra text accompanying note 115.
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principal object was the owner of the merged property, but he
(i.e., the principal owner) ordinarily was liable to the owner of
the accessory object for its value.219 Regarding the principal
owner's obligation to compensate the owner of the accessory,
one scholar states:
If the owner of the incorporated thing had knowingly effected the
incorporation, he was regarded as having made a gift of his material
to the other party unless it could be shown that he did it as an act of
administration on the other's behalf when he would have an acto
negotiorum gestorum contraria.m
The nondominant author, under these principles, would be
entitled, through loss of his property by accessio, to
compensation from the principal/dominant author "for the
value of his material."21
This simple analysis only scratches the surface. Clearly,
the analysis will become more complex in the case of three,
four, or more putative joint authors. Courts will have to
determine where the various vanishing points occur or, at the
very least, whether the facts of any given case fall on the
positive side of the vanishing point (i.e., making the contributor
in question a joint author) or the negative side (i.e., making
him, potentially, a contributing author, entitled to restitution
by virtue of an implied in law contract). For example, in the
case of three putative joint authors, as the contribution of one
falls to less than 10% (meaning that the others are contributing
roughly 45% each) it may be deemed unreasonable for persons
to perceive the 10% contributor as a joint author entitled to
share profits equally with his two joint authors.
In addition to the problem of multiple putative joint
authors making the analysis more difficult, it is important to
recognize that the analysis should not rest solely on the
quantitative measure of a putative joint author's contribution.
A case in point would be the writing of a song. If one putative
joint author is responsible for only the chorus of a song (let's
assume for purposes of illustration that the chorus only
comprises 5% of the totality of the song, quantitatively
speaking) and his putative joint author contributed everything
219 The owner of the principal thing had to pay "compensation for the owner of
what was incorporated for his vanished property." J.A.C. THOMAS, A TEXTBOOK OF
ROMAN LAW 171 (1976).
220 Id. (footnote omitted).
221 Id. (citing Justinian's Digest, D.6.1.23.4).
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else (e.g., all other lyrics and music, quantitatively the other
95% of the song), arguably, the person who contributed the
chorus still has a legitimate claim of joint authorship. The
legitimacy of this claim is based on the fact that the qualitative
nature of his contribution is so significant that reasonable
persons are likely to perceive that the contribution of the
chorus of a song should entitle that contributor to be a joint
author, share in half of the profit of the song and exercise
ownership of it as well.m
D. Benefits of Applying the Contract Model of Objective
Intent to Joint Authorship
1. A Clear Framework: Not a Subjective Standard
The Childress court set the stage for a completely new
interpretation of joint authorship, stating that in addition to an
intent to merge their contributions, joint authors must intend
to "regard themselves as joint authors."2 Subsequently, other
courts have unhesitatingly followed Judge Newman's lead,
requiring an intent to be joint authors as an essential element
of the intent requirement for joint authorship.' Scholarly
criticism of the Childress intent rule has been fairly harsh.'
Professor LaFrance recognizes that a contribution might have significant
qualitative aspects. She asks: "should the contribution be evaluated qualitatively,
quantitatively, or both?" See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 232 (footnote omitted). See
also Buckalew, supra note 104, at 582.
223 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
2?A See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson
v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994).
Professor LaFrance, for one, refers to this requirement as a "relationship
test." LaFrance, supra note 110, at 200. According to LaFrance, "This 'relationship' test
departs from earlier articulations of the joint work analysis by focusing not on the
collaborators' intent to undertake a particular type of creative process, but on their
intent to enter into a particular relationship with one another." Id. LaFrance criticizes
the 'relationship test," arguing that it "has no foundation in the copyright statutes or
their legislative history. In addition courts that have adopted this gloss have failed to
provide any useful definition of the requisite intent." Id. (footnote omitted). She
complains further that this test "results in the denial of authorial status to persons
who make significant creative contributions to a work" and that, consequently, it "fails
to advance the purpose of the Copyright Act because it will deny these contributors the
economic rewards that might encourage them to continue their creative efforts in the
future." Id. at 201. A three-tiered contract analysis remedies LaFrance's issue. Authors
who make significant contributions, such as Lynn Thomson, would be capable of
recovering on a quantum meruit theory (implied in law contract) for the value that
they confer upon the dominant author. One of LaFrance's most poignant criticisms of
the "relationship test" is that, as far as she is able to discern, it uses as its benchmark
the subjective intent of the authors. Id. at 202 ("the joint work analysis has been
distorted from an analysis of the process by which a work is created to an analysis of
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As this section will demonstrate, however, when interpreted in
light of the objective intent model-using the objective
manifestations of the parties as the legal indicia of intent-the
Childress intent rule can lead to imminently equitable results
that promote the goals of copyright law to promote progress
through incentives.
Perhaps the most distinct advantage of the objective
intent model is that the framework of the approach is
straightforward. First, a court uses objective criteria to
determine whether the putative joint authors intended to be
bound as joint authors. In other words, did the putative joint
authors enter an implied in fact contract of joint authorship? If
so, then they are joint authors and each should be entitled to
an equal share of the copyright. If the court determines that
the putative authors are not joint authors, it must determine
whether the nondominant author(s) has made, at least, a
copyrightable contribution. If so, the court must determine the
value of that copyrightable contribution to the collaborative
work. That determination will dictate the amount of restitution
to which the contributing author is entitled. Put another way,
this value represents the amount by which the dominant
author has been unjustly enriched by the nondominant
contributing author's contribution. The nondominant
contributing author is essentially entitled to quantum meruit.
Lastly, there is a third category the court should consider
whether the nondominant contributor's contribution: (1) is
unoriginal (i.e., if the contribution is either trivial or purely
functional); (2) is an idea (or ideas) rather than expression; (3)
was rendered in circumstances where such a contribution is
typically considered gratuitous; or (4) was made in return for
separate consideration (i.e., as distinct from joint authorship as
consideration). If the contributor's contribution falls into this
third category, then the contributor should be entitled neither
to a half copyright interest as joint author nor to quantum
meruit (i.e., restitution) based on principles of unjust
enrichment.
The straightforward framework of the contract model of
objective intent contrasts sharply with one of the principal
weaknesses of the Childress rule, establishing a subjective test
each co-creator's subjective intent to share authorial laurels with one or more of the
others. The result has been a troubling array of decisions that appear to be more
influenced by the egos of the putative authors than by the objective evidence of how the
work was created.") (footnote omitted).
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for joint author intent.' Childress failed to define subjective
"intent."27 A subjective definition of intent permits one
author's, typically the dominant author's, subjective state of
mind to operate as a dispositive factor in determining sole
authorship, as opposed to joint authorship. s
The Childress court forged the subjectivity rule with the
unfortunate statement that, in order to be considered joint
authors, persons need to "entertain in their minds the concept
of joint authorship, whether or not they understood precisely
the legal consequences of that relationship."m There at least
two problems with this statement of the law of joint
authorship. One problem is excusable and the other is, frankly,
inexcusable. However, both can be solved through explanation
and by applying the contract model of objective intent.
First, by saying that putative joint authors must
"entertain in their minds a concept of joint authorship," the
Childress court fell prey to the same nineteenth century
misconception that once led judges to pronounce that
contracting parties had to engage in a "meeting of the minds"
in order to have a valid offer and acceptance.m Certainly, had
the court reflected, it would have reconsidered.21 Such a gross
misstatement of the manner in which modem law treats intent
on the part of contracting parties-in this case parties tacitly
agreeing to share joint ownership of copyright-is inexcusable.
The copyright test to determine joint authorship must be the
same as it is in modern contract law; namely, the objective
manifestations of the parties' intent must control, not their
secretly harbored, undisclosed conceptions entertained in the
mind.22 Thus, realistically, in order to be considered joint
authors, authors must objectively manifest an intent to share
ownership of copyright.
The second problem with the court's statement is its
acknowledgement that the parties may not necessarily
comprehend "precisely the legal consequences of that
22 Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
227 See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 245.
m See id. at 224, 229 (citing Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., No. 91 C 1964,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2690, at 28 & n.1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1992)), 245, 262; see also
Kwall, supra note 114, at 52; Buckalew, supra note 104, at 569, 576.
Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 121.
231 See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946).
232..
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relationship.'" Although problematic, this statement is
excusable. Joint authors are frequently more interested in the
artistic and synergistic aspects of their enterprise than the
legal ones. We should not expect them all to appreciate the
legal significance of joint authorship. Similarly, contract law
does not presume that all contracting parties appreciate the
sometimes intricate ramifications of entering into a legally
recognizable bargain. A seller who breaches his contract may
not, for example, understand that he will be liable to his buyer
for the difference between the agreed contract price and the
price at which his buyer purchased substitute goods. Yet,
contract law considers the seller legally bound when his words
or conduct objectively manifest an intent to be bound.
Similarly, although joint authors may not appreciate all of the
finer points regarding the law of joint authorship,2 it is
sufficient if they manifest an intent to share the copyright
ownership. Like parties to a contract, a general idea of what
joint authorship entails should suffice.
2. Contract Model Provides a Workable Definition of
Intent
In addition to providing a macroscopic framework for
analyzing questions of joint authorship, the contract model of
objective intent defines "intent" using an analysis proven to
work in contract law. The failure to define intent is a weakness
in the Childress formulation. Utilizing an objective approach,
the contract model offers a definition of intent that is likely to
protect the interests of the parties and yield workable, fair
results. The contract model makes it clear that contributors are
not required to be mind :readers. Contributors should be able to
reasonably rely on the objective manifestations of their own
intent and those of their co-authors. Thus, the substantiality of
their contributions and the objective manifestations of their
own intent both to merge those contributions and to share
Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. Joint authors may freely exploit a joint work
without the permission of fellow joint authors. But a joint author is required to pay his
fellow joint authors a pro rata share of any profits recognized. A work that is the
product of joint authorship will have a different duration than otherwise. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(b) (2002). It is possible that the renewal of copyright could be affected if a work is
deemed to be a joint work. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). A joint work will be subject to special
rules regarding the waiver of moral rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1). And the
potentiality for a termination of transfers is unique for a joint work. See 17 U.S.C. §§
203, 304(c)-(d).
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copyright ownership should serve as a factual basis (i.e.,
evidence) for establishing their rights vel non as joint
authors.m
One commentator expressed concern that objective
criteria will not be useful in evaluating intent, noting:
"Whereas the intent to merge contributions will often be
readily ascertainable from objective evidence, intent to share
authorship is ill-defined and may not be reflected in any
objective manifestations, thus making it more difficult to
establish in most cases. " u This hypothesis seems entirely
unfounded. Determining intent by means of objective
manifestations is precisely the manner in which contract law
operates. The Lee court put this matter in perspective:
The best objective manifestation of shared intent, of course, is a
contract saying that the parties intend to be or not to be co-authors.
In the absence of a contract, the inquiry must of necessity focus on
the facts. The factors articulated in this decision and the Second and
Seventh Circuit decisions cannot be reduced to a rigid formula,
because the creative relationships to which they apply vary too
much. Different people do creative work together in different ways,
and even among the same people working together the relationship
may change over time as the work proceeds.'
The contract model takes this problem out of the realm
of the "ill-defined." It is a cop-out, at the very least, to say that
intent "may not be reflected in any objective manifestations."2
Just as intent to be bound in contractual relations is reflected
in the outward manifestations of a person's conduct (e.g.,
words, tone of voice, facial expressions, gestures, surrounding
circumstances, prior course of dealing, usage of trade), so too is
the intent of joint authors reflected in objective manifestations,
including the qualitative and quantitative nature of the parties'
contributions, control, express statements, credit/billing, usage
of trade and course of dealing. These are multiple indicia of
intent to share ownership of copyright. This is what the Lee
court appreciated when it characterized the Second Circuit's
M5 LaFrance, supra note 110, at 245 ("Contributors of copyrightable material
will rarely be completely sure of the subjective intent of all the other contributors. Yet,
under the relationship test, they cannot rely on the substantiality of their contributions
as a sufficient factual basis for establishing their co-authorship rights.").
2 Id.
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
LaFrance, supra note 110, at 245.
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inquiry as resting on "who has decision making authority, how
the parties bill themselves, and other evidence."2 9
As further illustration, consider the Thomson case. The
Thomson court established four factors to be used in
determining intent: (1) decisionmaking authority; (2)
billing/credits; (3) written agreements with third parties; and
(4) other evidence. These factors support the contract model of
objective intent because they all relate to the objective
manifestations of the intent of the putative joint authors. All
are indicative of how reasonable persons would perceive
themselves and their co-authors, and they all relate to whether
reasonable persons in similar circumstances would perceive
themselves and their co-authors as entitled to share the
copyright ownership. The Lee court articulates three factors: (1)
supervision and control; (2) objective manifestations of intent;
and (3) audience appeal.240 Upon brief reflection, it seems clear
that each of these three factors actually looks to objective
criteria/evidence. The Lee court used credit/billing as a
paradigmatic example of an objective manifestation of intent,
but all of the other circumstantial evidence is useful in the
inquiry as well. The contract model suggests that credit should
still be considered merely as one factor. After all, the
significance of a party's contribution arguably can outweigh the
amount of credit given, since the party with the greater
bargaining power (like Spike Lee) might be able to dictate the
amount of credit given. The Lee court hits the nail right on the
head: "We say objective manifestations because, were the
mutual intent to be determined by subjective intent, it could
become an instrument of fraud, were one coauthor to hide from
the other an intention to take sole credit for the work."21 The
contract model of objective intent uses these articulated factors
as objective indicia of intent to become joint authors. As such,
these factors bear a significant relationship to a determination
of joint authorship. u2
M Lee, 202 F.3d at 1234 (footnote omitted).
24 Id. See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 248-49 (footnote omitted) ("The third
factor, audience appeal, is unique to the Ninth Circuit's approach, but its significance
is unclear. The court may have intended it simply as a proxy for the inseparability or
interdependence of the collaborators' contributions.").
241 Lee, 202 F.3d at 1234.
LaFrance argues that the Childress-Thomson approach is guilty of
"introducing factors that bear no relationship to the authorial efforts of the putative co-
authors." See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 262.
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3. The Dominant Author's Subjective State of Mind Is
Not a Controlling Factor
A related benefit of the contract model is that it
eliminates the possibility that a dominant author's subjective
state of mind (i.e., her subjective intent to be the work's sole
author) will be regarded as a dispositive factor.2 Professor
LaFrance criticizes Childress because the "approach gives the
entire copyright to the dominant author if that is the result that
he or she intends."2" LaFrance points to Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre' as an example of this problem: 'The unspoken
premise appears to be that Erickson was the dominant author,
and thus, under Childress, could unilaterally deny joint
authorship to all other participants regardless of their intent or
contributions !
The contract model, however, grants copyright
ownership to the dominant author only if a reasonable person
in the position of the nondominant author would perceive that
the dominant author did not intend to share the copyright
equally. This is not a per se rule. The contract model does not
permit one party's subjective state of mind to determine the
status of joint authors. The existence vel non of an implied in
fact contract depends on many different factors, one of the least
of which would be the unexpressed inner thoughts of one of the
putative joint authors.24 The essence of the contract model is
that joint authorship is determined on the basis of what
reasonable persons in the positions of the putative joint
authors would perceive. The court's decision in Smashing
Pumpkins illustrates an application of this principle. Although
Morill, apparently the dominant author, may have subjectively
believed that he was the sole author of the video, the court
A number of commentators and courts have expressed concern that this
could be the case. See, e.g., id. at 224, 229, 262; Kwall, supra note 114, at 52; Childress
v. Taylor, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Buckalew, supra note 104, at
569, 576.
2, LaFrance, supra note 110, at 224 (emphasis added).
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
LaFrance, supra note 110, at 229. See also id. at 262 ("The relationship test
places one collaborator at the mercy of another's subjective intent, even if that intent is
never communicated.") (footnote omitted).
27 See Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505 (Or. 1977) (permitting the
introduction of testimony regarding the subjective state of mind of a party relating to
intent to contract, so long as the jury was properly instructed regarding the rile of
objective intent).
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determined that the conduct of the parties revealed objective
manifestations of intent for joint authorship.
By adding a reasonable person standard to the calculus,
the alleged lack of fairness to a nondominant author
disappears. 2 The contract model of objective intent treats
nondominant authors' "stories" as evidence of the objective
manifestation of the intent of the parties. As such, the
nondominant author's "voice" can be heard and the court can
evaluate that voice to determine the manner in which
reasonable persons would perceive it.2 9 Evidence of what the
parties said, the manner in which they expressed their
thoughts, and the surrounding circumstances are relevant
regarding whether reasonable persons would perceive the
existence of a tacit joint authorship agreement (i.e., an implied
in fact contract). Consider a hypothetical example involving a
dominant author who contributes 60% and a nondominant
author who contributes 40%. Ordinarily, reasonable persons
are likely to consider themselves joint authors, given these
respective contributions. Thus, even if the dominant (60%)
author were to testify that he secretly, subjectively considered
himself the sole author (i.e., not party to an implied in fact
contract of joint authorship), a court could easily determine
that a reasonable person in the position of both the
nondominant (40%) author and the dominant (60%) author
would have perceived themselves as having offered and
accepted a tacit, implied in fact contract of joint authorship.
The relative equality of their contributions (60% to 40%) could
be sufficient evidence that reasonable persons would consider
themselves as joint authors (even if this particular dominant
author subjectively did not). In this manner, an objective test
protects the reasonable perceptions of nondominant authors
Kwall criticizes Childress saying:
The aspect of Childress requiring that all putative joint authors share a
mutual intent to be joint authors is equally problematic. By virtue of its
inevitable operation, this standard will always result in privileging the
narrative of the dominant author. Indeed, under a subjective standard
focusing on what the parties said and thought, the dominant author...
will always dispute the intent of co-authorship.
Kwall, supra note 114, at 55. Kwall's criticism is resolved by application of the objective
contract model.
Id. at 61 ("Stories about the creation of jointly authored works should be a
critical, and fundamental, component of the way in which joint authorship disputes are
decided. The important question still remains, however, of how courts should assess
the impact of these stories in making joint authorship decisions. In other words, how
should the joint authorship doctrine be molded to take into account the personality-
based narrative of the collaborative creator?").
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and imposes on dominant authors a standard of reasonableness
as well.
Similarly, "the dominant author might be identified as
the party who made the largest contribution to the final
work."2° As has been*noted, as a matter of pure logic, the
"larger" a party's contribution, the more likely it will be that
the other putative joint authors will perceive that there is no
tacit agreement to share the copyright 50-50. As one person's
contribution rises well over 50%, it is correspondingly less
likely that his fellow contributors will think it fair for them to
share the copyright 50-50, and it seems less likely also that
they will perceive that the dominant author intends to share
the copyright ownership 50-50.
The District Court opinion in Childress actually visited
this issue and recognized the importance of relying on an
objective rather than subjective definition of intent: "a
subjective state of mind cannot of itself satisfy the objective
criteria of the copyright law, particularly where that state of
mind was emphatically not shared by the purported co-
author." 1 This statement responds to the type of situation
where a nondominant author subjectively believes herself to be
a joint author but the dominant author "emphatically" does not
perceive of the nondominant author as a joint author. The word
"emphatically" in this context could mean at least two things.
First, it could, in some conceivable scenarios, mean "expressly."
When a dominant author expressly states that he does not
consider a work to be a joint work, that expression is highly
probative of a lack of intent on his part to enter into an implied
in fact contract of joint authorship. Second, "emphatically"
could mean "overtly." So, if a dominant author's conduct, rather
than express words, indicates that he did not intend joint
authorship, that too is highly probative of the absence of such
intent. In either case, the word "emphatically" in this context,
at the very least, implies that the objective manifestations of
the dominant author's words and/or conduct do not indicate-
to a reasonable person in the position of the nondominant
author-an intent to enter into an implied in fact contract of
joint authorship.
250 LaFrance, supra note 110, at 231.
251 Childress v. Taylor, No. 87 C 6924, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15969 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 27, 1990).
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To be sure, one stubborn collaborator cannot be
permitted to wrest ownership from nondominant authors in
circumstances where to do so would be unreasonable.m2 By the
same token, in a case involving a sale of goods where a buyer
insists to a seller that there is no contract but the buyer,
nevertheless, takes possession of the goods and uses them,
commercial law will impose a contract on the buyer. By
accepting and using goods in a manner inconsistent with the
seller's ownership, the buyer will be bound to pay for the goods.
The law of sales stands ready to fill in any additional gaps in
the sales agreement that are necessary.2' By analogy, then,
copyright law may borrow a contract-like gap-filling system to
impose obligations and an implied in fact contract of joint
authorship in circumstances where a joint author unreasonably
denies the existence of joint authorship with his fellow joint
authors.
Other related contract-like issues may need to be
addressed in situations involving an author (again, typically, a
dominant author) who insists on denying joint authorship. It
will be relevant to determine at what point in the collaborative
process the dominant author expressly denies joint authorship.
If he makes the denial late in the collaborative process, it may
be too late. At some point, a reasonable person in the position
of the nondominant author will perceive that the dominant
author intends joint authorship. By that point, a reasonable
person in the position of the nondominant author may
reasonably have begun relying upon the implicit promises of
joint authorship and the expectation of joint ownership that
comes along with it.
If, on the other hand, the unreasonable dominant
author were to express his intent not to be a joint author (but
rather, the sole author) at the outset of the collaboration, or so
early in the process that a reasonable person in the position of
the nondominant author would not yet have begun to rely on
any promises implicit in his (i.e., the dominant author's)
conduct, arguably such circumstances would make it
262 Buckalew expresses a concern that one party-typically the dominant
author-might be capable of stubbornly insisting on sole authorship: "the Thomson
court paved the way for a collaborator to appropriate for himself all rights to a work of
collaboration by simply refusing to acknowledge that the other person collaborating on
a copyrightable work is a coauthor. Whether or not they act as coauthors becomes
irrelevant." Buckalew, supra note 104, at 576. If this interpretation of Thomson is
accurate, common sense dictates that it will need to be adjusted.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-305-310 (2002).
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unreasonable for the nondominant author to proceed with the
collaboration or with any expectation of sharing the authorship
or ownership. If a nondominant author were to proceed with a
collaboration under these circumstances, a court may wish to
interpret that conduct (i.e., continuing with the collaboration in
the face of the dominant author expressly denying an intent to
share joint authorship) as having created a gift of the work
contributed by the nondominant author to the dominant
author.2 It would not be unjust enrichment where a
nondominant author proceeds to contribute to a collaborative
effort either knowing or with reason to know that the dominant
author does not intend joint authorship. Alternatively, this
situation may be appropriate for the application of an implied
in law contract. Perhaps the particular facts of any given case
would influence a court's decision to treat the nondominant
author's contribution, in such circumstances, as either a gift or
as providing a basis for restitution.
In sum, then, a contract, even one that is implied in
fact, requires mutual intent on the part of both offeror and
offeree. One party's subjective state of mind cannot determine
the status of joint authorship. Both parties must manifest
objective intent to be bound. The circumstances are the same to
constitute copyright joint authorship; both dominant and
nondominant authors must manifest an intent to be bound in
an implied contract of joint authorship. The reasonable
perceptions of both parties, not just the dominant author, are
pertinent to making that determination.2
4. Persons Who Make Significant Contributions are
Ordinarily Entitled to Restitution, at Least, for Their
Contributions
One of the criticisms of the Childress approach is that it
"allows a court to deny joint authorship status even to a
contributor who satisfies the Goldstein test [i.e., a contributor
who has contributed copyrightable expression, not merely
2M See supra text accompanying note 219.
2M Buckalew's criticism of Thomson is a fair one: "In examining the parties'
intention, the Thomson court did not even explore Thomson's intentions or her
understandings of Larson's intent in his use of her work; instead, it based its decision
solely upon the subjective state of mind of only one of the creators of Rent." Buckalew,
supra note 104, at 569. Using a. contractual model to explain situations of joint
authorship, the court's error becomes clear.
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ideas, facts, or research] 2'6 because it allows a court to deny a
joint authorship claim even by one who made a substantial
copyrightable contribution to the finished work.",27  The
contract model of objective intent dictates that a court should
deny joint authorship status to such a contributor unless,
under the circumstances, the parties have objectively
manifested an intent to be bound as joint authors. A person
who makes a substantial copyrightable contribution, but a
contribution which, under the circumstances, does not make
him a joint author by virtue of an implied in fact contract, may,
nonetheless, be an author, and may be entitled to
compensation based upon a contract implied in law.
The example of 95%-5% contributors illustrates this
point. Generally, where one party contributes 95% to a work
and the other party only contributes 5%, absent extenuating
circumstances," reasonable persons in the relative positions of
these two contributors will not perceive that the other is either
offering or accepting an agreement of joint ownership or joint
authorship of the copyright; entailing an equal sharing of the
ownership and profits. Thus, although the 5% contributor has
made a copyrightable contribution, and although the parties
intended to merge their respective contributions into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole, it
would be unreasonable, and, therefore, unfair for copyright law
to label these two authors as joint authors, each sharing the
copyright ownership 50-50. Such a rule would impose an
injustice on the 95% contributor. But it would also be unjust to
deny the 5% contributor any share of the profit. The 5%
contributor is, after all, an author too (by virtue of having
contributed copyrightable expression). That is why it is
appropriate to consider the 5% contributor an author or a
"contributing author." That is also why it is appropriate to
permit him to recover in restitution on the theory of an implied
in law contract.
The contract model of objective intent solves this
problem by permitting an author who makes a copyrightable
contribution which is greater than de minimis but who cannot
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACrICE § 4.2.1.2
(1989).
27 LaFrance, supra note 110, at 224.
For example, a prior course of dealing between the parties, in which they
traditionally shared the copyright 50-50; or when the 5% contribution is the catchy,
memorable chorus of a song.
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meet the implied in fact mutual intent requirement of co-
authorship, to recover in quantum meruit, on an unjust
enrichment theory (implied in law contract).2 9 These authors
can still receive economic restitution to prevent unjust
enrichment. ° There is no need to require a "higher standard of
originality" as a prerequisite to joint authorship. 21 There is a
need to characterize someone as an author-a contributing
author-when he makes a copyrightable contribution to a
work. But there is also a need to recognize that every author
who makes such a contribution need not be classified as a joint
author. All joint authors are authors, but not all authors who
contribute copyrightable material that is merged with the work
of another qualify as joint authors. Those authors who
contribute copyrightable material to a merged work but fail to
qualify as joint authors will ordinarily be entitled to
restitution, unless the facts indicate that thier contribution
was gratuitous or the subject of separate consideration.m
So long as the nondominant author's contributions are
copyrightable, the contract model of objective intent gives the
nondominant author a proportionate share of the profits, based
on a theory of implied in law contract. Without the contract
model, the dominant author is unjustly enriched by the
nondominant author's contribution. Of course, circumstances
such as industry custom may vitiate a claim of restitution
where the nondominant author's contribution is deemed to
have been made gratuitously or for separate consideration (e.g.,
as is the case with research assistants, editors, friends who
read and comment on a manuscript, and, perhaps, actors
making suggestions during rehearsal).
29 The Thomson court also raised another pertinent issue, when it
commented: "Our circuit has not decided whether a person who makes a non-de
minimis copyrightable contribution but cannot meet the mutual intent requirement of
co-authorship retains, in the absence of a work-for-hire agreement or any explicit
contractual assignment of the copyright, any rights and interests in his or her own
contribution." Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Buckalew,
supra note 104, at 582 (regarding the possibility of establishing a test that would allow
a court to award a remedy, such as restitution, rather than outright ownership as a
full-fledged joint author).
WD LaFrance complains: "This restrictive view of joint authorship goes far
beyond what is necessary to distinguish works from derivative works, compilations,
and collective works, and denies economic rewards to persons whose creative efforts
satisfy the constitutional and statutory concepts of authorship." LaFrance, supra note
110, at 255.
261 See id. at 260-61.
See supra text accompanying note 217.
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As one commentator points out, "Childress envisioned
only two default categories of collaborators: joint authors and
nonauthors with no copyright interests. The court left other
kinds of collaborators 'to protect their rights through
contract.'" ' Because it offers the third option of recognizing a
nondominant author as a "contributing author," the contract
model of objective intent ameliorates this problem.
5. Although One Author's Dominance Over Another is
Relevant in Determining Whether Joint Authorship
Exists, it is Not a Dispositive Factor
The contract model of objective intent treats the
dominance of one collaborator as relevant because one
collaborator's dominance may indicate that he did not manifest
an intent to share copyright ownership. So, when A dominates
the collaborative process, a reasonable person in the position of
the fellow collaborator, B, may be less likely to perceive that A
intends to be bound in a joint authorship. Hence, one
collaborator's dominance over another should be considered
relevant evidence of intent, using an objective theory of intent
as a basis for analysis."
Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 964, 968 (1999) (citing Childress v.
Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). There are often similar problems inherent in
many "all-or-nothing" legal formulae. The lack of justice in all-or-nothing systems is the
reason why, for example, in the context of tort law, so many jurisdictions have begun to
apply some sort of comparative negligence theory, rather than the old contributory
negligence scheme. Moral and ethical teachings for centuries have advocated that
rewards ought to be commensurate with the value of one's contributions. The objective
theory of joint authorship intent will have the effect of privileging dominant authors
only in circumstances where reasonable persons-in the position of the nondominant
authors-would not perceive themselves as entitled to share copyright ownership. And
in many cases where the nondominant author's contributions are copyrightable, he
would, at least, be entitled to compensation for the value of his contribution. See also
Kwall, supra note 114, at 57. Kwall proposes that courts should find an alternative to
dispersing ownership equally and profits equally as tenants in common. She hopes that
finding an alternative method could be "more sensitive to the nondominant author's
personality-based narrative of creation . . . ." Id. Kwall articulates the problem itself
but fails to offer a practical solution. The contract model of objective intent offers a
concrete, workable solution to her issues. See also Buckalew, supra note 104, at 574.
Buckalew uses the separate contractual arrangement between Larson and his previous
collaborator, Aronson, to illustrate the fact "that equitable arrangements can be made
other than the all-or-nothing arrangement implied by the Thomson court in finding
that either a person is a joint author and has an undivided interest or a person is not a
joint author and has no interest whatsoever." Id.
See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 224 ("Childress clearly treats one
collaborator's dominance over another as relevant in determining the nondominant
party's entitlement to co-authorship status."); Kwall, supra note 114, at 5 ("In practice,
the operation of the joint authorship doctrine privileges the voices of dominant authors
[Vol. 68: 1
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General principles of jurisprudence and fairness
indicate, for example, that a person who contributes 95% to
another author's 5% is entitled to manifest the logical
expectation that he will be unwilling to share copyright
ownership 50-50. Indeed, this approach fosters copyright policy
by encouraging authorship, and higher quality authorship. An
opposite rule would lead to negative results. If, for example, a
95% contributor knows that he will be required to share
copyright ownership with a 5% contributor, the 95%
contributor will be less likely to seek the assistance of the 5%
contributor. Hence, the 95% contributor may become
discouraged and never finish the project, or the finished work
may be of a lesser quality because it lacks the polish or punch
that the 5% contributor might have added.2
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one can imagine an
extreme case where one party (say the dominant author)
expressly denies the existence of joint authorship but still
conducts himself as a joint author. Even express words do not
necessarily control a determination of whether joint authorship
exists. In circumstances such as these, a court could still find
joint authorship, despite an author's words to the contrary.
Just as in contract law, the totality of the circumstances may
have greater force than the specific language employed by a
party.
CONCLUSION
This article has focused primarily on "intent" and its
relationship to copyright. In particular, the article has explored
two aspects of intent. First, we asked whether intent is an
essential element of copyrightability. Nimmer argues that it is.
I contend, instead, that a putative author's subjective intent to
create variations that are more than trivial should serve as
evidence-one factor-in determining whether a work is
original. Similarly, I suggest that a putative author's subjective
intent to recreate facts also ought to be considered as a factor,
tending to indicate that the putative author's resulting work is
over those of nondominant contributors, thereby submerging the voices of those who
furnish qualitatively important, though quantitatively less significant, components of a
particular work.").
M6 See LaFrance, supra note 110, at 232 ("Nothing in the statutes, their
legislative history, or the underlying purposes of copyright law suggests that one
author's dominance of a collaborative process entitles that author to dictate whether or
not the resulting work is joint.").
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unoriginal, therefore not copyrightable. Building on these
principles, the article also looked at recent cases that have
construed originality. These cases reveal that courts are
disinclined to rely on a putative author's intent, and that courts
should employ a trivial variation analysis (not an examination
of the undefined term "creativity") in order to determine
originality. These discussions relating to the roles of "intent"
and "trivial variation" in determining originality are intended
to assist courts in their determinations of originality.
Second, this article proposed a contract analysis to
define "intent" for purposes of joint authorship. This contract
model of objective intent borrows standard contract theory and
doctrine to establish an analytical framework for decision-
making. The contract model suggests that the objective
manifestations of intent on the part of the putative joint
authors should determine whether an implied in fact contract
of joint authorship has been created. This model also
recommends that, when an author makes a contribution to a
work that is insufficient to elevate him to the level of a joint
author by means of an implied in fact contract of joint
authorship, he ought still be, in the typical case, entitled to
restitution for the value of his contribution (by means of an
implied in law contract). I hope that the contract model of
objective intent can offer some guidance for courts as they
struggle to balance the respective interests of multiple
contributors to copyrightable works.
Having in place viable methods for determining what is
original versus what is unoriginal (and hence part of the public
domain) is vital to protect the interests of authors, publishers
and the public. Thus, it is important to know just where a
putative author's intent fits into the picture. Similarly, having
in place a viable method for determining when contributors are
joint authors versus when they are not (and hence not entitled
to share a half interest in the copyright) is also vital to protect
the interests of authors, publishers and the public. Therefore, it
is important to know just how to analyze intent in the context
of joint authorship. As I stated at the outset, copyright law has
surged to the forefront of social, economic and political debate.
Global information policies affect most of us in increasingly
important ways. The law must strive to balance the interests of
authors, publishers and the public. Given that copyright has
become such a critical part of our global economy and
information network, it is essential that we occasionally take
the time to examine carefully the foundational building blocks
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of the law. Intent, originality, creativity, joint authorship and
the relationships among them are foundational building blocks
that call for careful examination. I hope that this article has
helped us take a closer look. And I hope that it has articulated
analyses that can prove helpful.

